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The Prosecutor’s Vulture: Inconsistent MBTA
Prosecution, its Clash with Wind Farms, and How to Fix
it
Scott W. Brunner†
U.S. wind-farm development has exploded in the last two decades.
But so have birds—literally. Wind farms are incidentally causing
deaths to migratory birds and at an increasing rate each year (the
most recent United States Fish & Wildlife Service (USFWS) estimates suggest over 400,000 annually). As a result, the Migratory
Bird Treaty Act (MBTA), a nearly 100-year-old U.S. environmental
statute, potentially makes wind-farm operators white collar criminals, even if they were acting without intent.
Controversially, wind-farm operators are not being prosecuted for
bird deaths, whereas other industry-types have been prosecuted under the MBTA and even convicted on certain occasions. Notable is
the 2012 case United States v. Brigham Oil & Gas, where seven oil
companies were federally prosecuted for causing a combined twenty-seven bird deaths. These seven companies survived prosecution
in North Dakota federal court; however, in light of Brigham Oil and
similar cases, the lack of wind-farm prosecution certainly begs the
question: Why should some industry-types face prosecution for incidentally killing birds while another industry-type gets a free pass?
And regardless of that answer, why are wind-farms being allowed
to develop and prosper despite posing increasingly grave threats to
U.S. wildlife?
This Article analyzes the lack of wind-farm prosecution, addresses
the growing upheaval surrounding it, and argues that the centuryold MBTA is due for an update. Alternatively, this Article puts forth
that prosecutors’ approaches to MBTA prosecution are in dire need
of rethinking: guidance pushing usage of prosecutorial agreements—with DPAs and NPAs—may be a temporary solution. Ultimately, the MBTA represents an unforeseen clash between clean
† Associate Attorney, Meissner Tierney Fisher & Nichols, S.C., Milwaukee, Wis.; J.D., 2012,
Marquette University Law School; B.A., 2009, University of Minnesota.
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energy and wildlife conservation. Past scholarship has focused on
how the MBTA’s text encompasses wind-farm operators; this Article builds on that by identifying the most appropriate solutions to
this conundrum. Reworked statutory language that invokes an incidental-take exception for all industry-types could set the MBTA
back to its wildlife-conservation purpose while also ensuring fairer
prosecutorial practices and keeping otherwise-innocent wind-farm
operators from becoming white collar criminals.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Birds die due to human activity often. They hit buildings, cars, and
airplanes by the millions each year.1 But they also die by landing in oil
1. COMM. ON ENVTL. IMPACTS OF WIND-ENERGY PROJECTS, NAT’L RES. COUNCIL,
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS OF WIND-ENERGY PROJECTS 71–72 (2007) [hereinafter IMPACTS OF
WIND-ENERGY PROJECTS] (noting the millions of birds that are killed by flying into airplanes, cars,
and building towers).
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pits, feeding on pesticide-filled fields, and blindly flying into wind
turbines.2 Oil companies, farmers, and even wind-turbine operators that
accidentally kill birds accomplish the “taking or killing” of a migratory
bird, and their actions could result in federal criminal prosecution under
the Migratory Bird Treaty Act (MBTA).3
However, the MBTA is applied inconsistently to unintentional
corporate actors in two ways. First, there is a circuit split over how the
MBTA’s criminal provisions apply to unintentional corporate actors.4
For example, in 2011, seven oil companies in North Dakota were
prosecuted for violating the MBTA in United States v. Brigham Oil &
Gas L.P.5 The district court judge in Brigham Oil found for the oil
companies, holding that the MBTA did not provide for criminal
prosecution of companies that incidentally kill or take migratory birds.6
However, other courts have found MBTA violations on similar facts.7
Second, there is disparate treatment of corporate or industrial actors
under the MBTA.8 The oil companies in Brigham Oil accounted for a
combined twenty-seven deaths of migratory birds.9 On the other hand,
estimates show that wind-turbine operators account for anywhere from
300,000- to 400,000-plus annual migratory bird deaths.10 Despite these
2. See cases cited infra Part III.
3. Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 703–712 (2006).
4. Throughout this paper, I use the phrases “unintentional corporate actors” and “unintentional
commercial entities.” Both of these phrases refer to businesses that accidentally (or unintentionally)
kill migratory birds as a result of their operations, and whose operations are not associated with
hunting, poaching, or game-related activities. Indeed, the MBTA’s language includes “association,
partnership, or corporation.” See 16 U.S.C. § 707(a). When I refer to “corporate actor” or
“commercial entity,” I am not necessarily distinguishing between business entities; I consider LLCs,
partnerships, etc, to all fall under my characterizations of “corporate actors” or “commercial
entities.”
5. 80 F. Supp. 2d 1202 (D.N.D. 2012).
6. Id.; see infra Part III.
7. See infra Part III.A. The most recent such case is United States v. Citgo Petroleum Corp.,
No. C-06-563, 2012 WL 3866857 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 5, 2012). Because the Citgo Petroleum case was
decided during the course of publication, it does not factor into this Article’s analysis.
8. Letter from Newt Gingrich to Lamar Smith, Chairman, House Committee on the Judiciary,
available at http://www.newt.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/LamarSmith.pdf [hereinafter Letter
from Newt Gingrich] (noting that the U.S. Attorney’s decision to prosecute the companies in the
Brigham Oil case represents an abuse of the judicial system given that no wind turbine operator has
ever been prosecuted).
9. Defendants Brigham and Newfield’s Joint Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion to
Dismiss the Informations at 2 n.1, United States v. Brigham Oil & Gas, L.P., 80 F.Supp.2d 1202
(D.N.D. 2012) (Nos. 11-PO-005-CSM-1, 11-PO-009-CSM-1), 2011 WL 6258226 at *2 n.1.
10. This number is disputed. Some estimates say about 30,000–40,000 annually, but those
numbers are more reflective of what existed ten years ago. IMPACTS OF WIND-ENERGY PROJECTS,
supra note 1, at 70–71 (noting that in 2003 the estimated wind-caused bird deaths were between
20,000 and 37,000); see also Letter from Newt Gingrich, supra note 8 (mentioning that wind
turbines account for 30,000 to 40,000 bird deaths each year). But see Press Release, Am. Bird
Conservancy, Am. Bird Conservancy Response to Speaker Gingrich’s Statement on Energy Indus.
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numbers, wind-turbine operators are not being prosecuted through the
MBTA.11 At one particular wind farm—Altamont Pass in California—
annual birds deaths have been measured at well over 5,000,12 which is far
more than the few dozen seen in Brigham Oil. The total number of
deaths caused by wind farms continues to rise as wind-turbine
construction blossoms.13 The increasing wind farm-related bird deaths
showcase selective prosecutorial tactics and have caused wind energy,
largely considered an environmental champion, to come under fire for
threatening wildlife and wildlife habitats.14
To be sure, a corporation that accidentally kills a bird is an unlikely
white collar criminal. The incidental “taking” or “killing” of a migratory
bird15 certainly does not fit the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s

Killing
of
Migratory
Birds
(Feb.
23,
2012),
available
at
http://www.abcbirds.org/newsandreports/releases/120223.html
[hereinafter
American
Bird
Conservancy Response to Speaker Gingrich] (insisting that Newt Gingrich’s numbers were very off,
and that USFWS had estimates in 2009 of around 440,000). With more wind turbines in operation,
studies indicate that the numbers have crept above 300,000 plus. Albert M. Manville, Towers,
Turbines, Power Lines, and Buildings—Steps Being Taken By the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service to
Avoid or Minimize Take of Migratory Birds at These Structures, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE FOURTH
INTERNATIONAL PARTNERS IN FLIGHT CONFERENCE, at 263, 268 (2008); David Urbanski, ‘BirdBrained’ Hypocrisy: Oil Companies Prosecuted for 28 Dead Waterfowl While Wind Companies Get
Away
with
Offing
400,000+
Every
Year,
THEBLAZE
(Sept.
30,
2011),
http://www.theblaze.com/stories/bird-brained-hypocrisy-oil-companies-prosecuted-for-28-deadwaterfowl-while-wind-companies-get-away-with-offing-400000-every-year/.
11. Alex Arensberg, Are Migratory Birds Extending Environmental Criminal Liability?, 38
ECOL. L.Q. 427, 441 (2011); John Arnold McKinsey, Regulating Avian Impacts Under the
Migratory Bird Treaty Act and Other Laws: The Wind Industry Collides with One of Its Own, The
Environmental Protection Movement, 28 ENERGY L.J. 71, 72 (2007); Laura J. Beveridge, The
Migratory Bird Treaty Act and Wind Development, N. AM. WINDPOWER, Sept. 2005, at 36, 36, 38–
39, available at http://www.stoel.com/files/Stoel0509.pdf.
12. See, e.g., ROBERT W. RIGHTER, WINDFALL: WIND ENERGY IN AMERICA TODAY 106
(2011).
13. See Manville, supra note 10, at 267–68 (noting that wind-turbine construction has
increased upwards to 50% annually).
14. See, e.g., Kevin A. Gaynor et al., Courts Seek Common-Sense Applications to Curb
Prosecutions Under Bird Law, 43 ER 974 (2012); Michael Bastasch, Report: Wind Tax Credits
Subsidize ‘Killing of Federally Protected Birds,’ THE DAILY CALLER (Oct. 5, 2012),
http://dailycaller.com/2012/10/05/report-wind-tax-credits-subsidize-killing-of-federally-protectedbirds/; Lawrence Hurley, Lawyers on Alert as Oil Company Challenges Conviction for Bird Kills,
E&E PUBL’G (May 21, 2012), http://www.eenews.net/public/Greenwire/2012/05/21/2; Letter from
New Gingrich, supra note 8; American Bird Conservancy Response to Speaker Gingrich, supra note
10 (noting that in 2009 the USFWS estimated wind turbines caused 440,000 annual bird deaths and
that the wind industry has been given a “virtual pass” for years); James M. Taylor, Enviro Group
Sues
Wind
Farm
to
Stop
Bird
Deaths,
HEARTLANDER
(Mar.
1,
2004),
http://news.heartland.org/newspaper-article/2004/03/01/enviro-group-sues-wind-farm-stop-birddeaths.
15. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 703–712 (2006) (listing the “actions” associated with migratory birds that
could result in MBTA liability).
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characterization of white collar crime: “lying, cheating, and stealing.”16
Arguably, the MBTA should not even be read to hold corporations
criminally liable for incidentally taking or killing migratory birds.
However, if the MBTA is to be applied to unintentional corporate actors,
its application must be fixed in two ways. First, MBTA application needs
uniformity across jurisdictions: companies arguably violating the MBTA
should not be safe in one jurisdiction because a judge reads the statute
narrowly, but liable for MBTA penalties in another jurisdiction because
the judge reads the statute broadly. With the current circuit split,17 either
the United States Supreme Court must grant certiorari to remedy this
situation or Congress must take legislative action amending the MBTA.
Second, U.S. prosecutors should not single out certain industry-types
while allowing others, such as the wind-energy industry, to be left
unaccountable for violations. If prosecutors continue to charge
commercial entities under the MBTA, tools such as non-prosecution
agreements (NPAs) or deferred-prosecution agreements (DPAs) may be
the best ways to hold parties accountable for MBTA violations in a fair
and uniform fashion.
This Article evaluates how best to ensure fairness in the MBTA
enforcement of violations by unintentional corporate actors, while still
staying true to the MBTA’s original intent and wildlife-preservation
values. Part II provides background on the MBTA generally, detailing its
origin and modern day usage. Part II also provides background on windenergy development, details the wind industry’s connection to bird
deaths, and applies the MBTA’s plain language to wind-farm operators
that unintentionally kill migratory birds. Part III describes previous cases
in which the MBTA has been used to prosecute commercial entities that
unintentionally killed migratory birds. In particular, Part III describes the
recent Brigham Oil case and discusses the circuit split concerning
whether the MBTA holds commercial entities strictly liable for the
unintentional taking or killing of a migratory bird. Part IV examines
prosecutorial discretion in the context of MBTA suits. This section
describes why the U.S. judicial system’s embrace of prosecutorial
discretion allows for U.S. attorneys to prosecute oil companies and not
wind-turbine operators, if they so choose. Part IV explains why selective
prosecution claims do not fit prosecutors’ decisions to charge MBTA
violations against only certain industry-types; consequently, selective
prosecution arguments are not sufficient remedies to the MBTA’s
inconsistent application by prosecutors.
16. Federal Bureau of Investigation, White Collar Crime, http://www.fbi.gov/aboutus/investigate/white_collar (last visited Mar. 30, 2012).
17. See infra Part III.
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Part V suggests that a legislative fix is needed to remedy the current
inconsistent, unfair, and arguably improper application of the MBTA’s
criminal provisions. Part V argues that Congress should amend the
MBTA either to incorporate an incidental-take exception or to expressly
include all unintentional corporate actors under its strict liability
provisions. In the alternative, internal United States Department of
Justice (U.S. DOJ) guidance should be created to encourage uniform
prosecutorial usage of DPAs and NPAs to hold unintentional corporate
actors accountable in cases of low-incident bird deaths. The Supreme
Court could grant certiorari to address whether a judicially carved-out
exception for unintentional corporate actors exists; though waiting for
the Supreme Court is not the best option. Finally, Part VI concludes this
Article.
II. THE MBTA AND HOW WIND FARMS FIT
A. The Migratory Bird Treaty Act
The MBTA, enacted in 1918,18 is the oldest federal law dedicated to
the protection of wildlife.19 In fact, it was one of the first federal
environmental laws created, with the first major U.S. environmental law
being passed in 1899.20 When the MBTA was created, its focal point was
to curb hunting practices in ways that helped conserve wildlife.21
18. Migratory Bird Treaty Act, ch. 128, 40 Stat. 755 (1918). The MBTA originated as a
bilateral treaty between then-British occupied Canada and the United States. See id. (giving effect to
Convention Between the United States and Great Britain for the Protection of Migratory Birds,
U.S.–Gr. Brit., Aug. 16, 1916, 39 Stat. 1709). For a detailed description of the MBTA’s treaty-based
origins, see Meredith Blaydes Lilley & Jeremy Firestone, Wind Power, Wildlife, and the Migratory
Bird Treaty Act: A Way Forward, 38 ENVTL. L. 1167, 1177–80 (2008).
19. The Lacey Act of 1900, ch. 553, 31 Stat. 187 (1900) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§
3371-3378 (2012)), is the only U.S. federal wildlife conservation law to precede the MBTA, but the
Lacey Act was primarily designed to prevent illegal wildlife trafficking, and not focused on wildlife
preservation. See id.; Mark D. Hopson et al., Finding the Middle Ground: A Survey of
Environmental Misdemeanors, in WHITE COLLAR CRIME, at V-1, V-5 (ABA Institute ed., 2011).
Other federal acts dedicated to wildlife preservation enacted subsequent the MBTA include the
Endangered Species Act, Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884 (1973) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C.
§§ 1531-1544 (2012)); the Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act of 1962, ch. 278, 54 Stat. 250
(1940) (as amended by Pub. L. No. 87-884, 76 Stat. 1246 (1962)); and the Marine Mammal
Protection Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-522, 86 Stat. 1027 (1972) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C.
§§ 1361-1423H (2012)).
20. The first federal environmental act was the Rivers & Harbors Act of 1899. See Rivers and
Harbors Act of 1899, ch. 425, 30 Stat. 1121 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 401-416 (1982)).
Environmental laws as a whole have a relatively short history. See Kathleen F. Brickey,
Environmental Crime at the Crossroads: The Intersection of Environmental and Criminal Law
Theory, 71 TUL. L. REV. 487, 488 (1996).
21. Conrad A. Fjetland, Possibilities for Expansion of the Migratory Bird Treaty Act for the
Protection of Migratory Birds, 40 NAT. RESOURCES J. 47, 50–51 (2000); Steven Margolin, Liability
Under the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 7 ECOLOGY L.Q. 989, 997 n.72 (1978).
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However, the MBTA criminal provisions are broad, which allows its
potential application to actions beyond those of just hunters and
poachers.22
Individual penalties for the MBTA are not necessarily severe,
especially for misdemeanor penalties, under which unintentional
corporate actors would most likely incur liability. An unintentional
“taking” or “killing” of a migratory bird results in a misdemeanor fine as
high at $15,000 or a prison sentence of six months, or both.23 A felony
MBTA conviction for an organization, which requires that the actions
resulting in violation be done “knowingly,” could result in a fine not
more than $500,000, imprisonment of up to two years, or both.24
However, the penalties are per bird, so depending on the number of bird
deaths or takings, the dollar amount can add up rather quickly.25
Moreover, the dollar amount in an MBTA prosecution might not be the
real concern for entities being charged because corporations may also
suffer grave reputational harm as a result of prosecution.26

22. Erin C. Perkins, Migratory Birds and Multiple-Use Management: Using the Migratory Bird
Treaty Act to Rejuvenate America’s National Environmental Policy, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 817, 841
(1998) (characterizing the MBTA language as “broad” and “expansive,” and noting how the broad
and expansive nature of the MBTA’s text allows for “near-absolute” protection of migratory birds,
irrespective the circumstances).
23. 16 U.S.C. §§ 703, 707(a) (2006); Lilley & Firestone, supra note 18, at 1180.
24. 16 U.S.C. § 707(b); 18 U.S.C. § 3571(c)(3) (2006). This Article focuses solely on
commercial entities that unintentionally kill migratory birds, and thus concerns only the
misdemeanor MBTA violation in section 707(a). The MBTA’s statutorily crafted felony fine is
actually less than the misdemeanor fine, at $2,000 and $15,000, respectively. See 16 U.S.C.
§ 707(a)–(b). However, title 18’s alternative fines provision allows the felony fine for organizations
to be up to $500,000. 18 U.S.C. § 3571(c)(3); Larry Martin Corcoran & Elinor Colbourn, Shocked,
Crushed and Poisoned: Criminal Enforcement in Non-Hunting Cases Under the Migratory Bird
Treaties, 77 DENV. U. L. REV. 359, 376 & n.136 (1999–2000).
The MBTA’s fine-amount anomaly could exist because, while attention has been paid to amend
the misdemeanor fine, the legislature has neglected to keep the felony fine up to speed. For example,
the 1960 MBTA amendment set the felony fine at $2,000 and the misdemeanor fine at $500. Migratory Bird Treaty Act, amendment, Pub. L. No. 86-732, § 1, 74 Stat. 866, 866 (1960) (prior to 1998
amendment). However, since the 1960 amendment, the misdemeanor fine has been amended twice
(once to $5,000 and then again to the present $15,000), while the felony fine has been left alone. See
Migratory Bird Treaty Act, DIGEST OF FED. RES. LAWS OF INTEREST TO THE U.S. FISH AND
WILDLIFE SERVICE, http://www.fws.gov/laws/lawsdigest/migtrea.html (last visited Apr. 25, 2012).
25. A $15,000 fine seems like a nominal amount, but that amount is per bird, which can
quickly escalate the total fine depending on how many bird deaths are being charged. Mark D.
Hopson et al., supra note 19, at V-5. The discussion in Part III.A points out that some courts
disagree over whether the MBTA allows for unintentional corporate actors to be charged multiple
counts.
26. See, e.g., David Spence, Corporate Social Responsibility in the Oil and Gas Industry, 86
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 59, 76 (2011); Benjamin M. Greenblum, Note, What Happens to a Prosecution
Deferred? Judicial Oversight of Corporate Deferred Prosecution Agreements, 105 COLUM. L. REV.
1863, 1886–88 (2005).
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Following the MBTA’s plain language, MBTA penalties attach to
corporations through section 703(a), which makes it “unlawful at any
time, by any means or in any manner, to . . . take [or] . . . kill . . . any
migratory bird, any part, nest or eggs of any such bird,” included in the
list of migratory birds provided by the United States Fish and Wildlife
Service (USFWS).27 The MBTA expressly lists “association, partnership,
or corporation” as potentially liable entities,28 and on its face, the MBTA
is no exception to the typical strict liability nature of federal
environmental statutes,29 with section 707(a) stating as follows:
. . . [A]ny person, association, partnership, or corporation who shall
violate any provisions of . . . this subchapter, or shall violate or fail
to comply with any shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and
upon conviction thereof shall be fined not more than $15,000 or be
imprisoned not more than six months, or both.30

Section 707(a) thus specifies that any partnership, association, or
corporation shall be liable upon violating any part of the MBTA.
Because taking or killing a migratory bird is a strict liability offense
through section 703(a), unintentional corporate actors could be
criminally prosecuted for and convicted of killing birds, without proof of
mens rea.31

27. 16 U.S.C. § 703(a). The USFWS’ list of protected birds reaches over 800. See U.S. FISH &
WILDLIFE SERV., Migratory Bird Mortality (2012), available at http://www.fws.gov/birds/mortalityfact-sheet.pdf. See generally Birds Protected By the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, USFWS,
http://www.fws.gov/migratorybirds/RegulationsPolicies/mbta/mbtandx.html#alpha1 (last visited
Apr. 2, 2012).
28. 16 U.S.C. § 707(a).
29. See, e.g., Comprehensive, Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
§ 107(a)–(b), 42 U.S.C. § 9603(a)–(b) (2006); Robert L. McMurry & Stephen D. Ramsey,
Environmental Crime: The Use of Criminal Sanctions in Enforcing Environmental Laws, 19 LOY.
L.A. L. REV. 1133, 1147 (1986) (describing the strict liability nature of CERCLA); Edmund B.
Frost, Strict Liability as an Incentive for Cleanup of Contaminated Property, 25 HOUS. L. REV. 951
(1988) (describing the general strict liability nature of hazardous cleanup crimes, notably CERCLA
and RCRA); Lynn L. Bergeson et al., TSCA and the Future of Chemical Regulation, 15 EPA ADMIN.
L. REP. 1, 9 (2000) (noting the strict liability nature of the Toxic Substances Control Act (citing 15
U.S.C. § 2615 (1994)). See generally Robert A. Milne, Comment, The Mens Rea Requirements of
the Federal Environmental Statutes: Strict Liability in Substance but Not Form, 37 BUFF. L. REV.
307 (1988) (describing the courts’ general findings of strict liability in environmental statutes). But
see Richard J. Lazarus, Meeting the Demands of Integration in the Evolution of Environmental Law:
Reforming Environmental Criminal Law, 83 GEO. L.J. 2407, 2471–73 (1995) (explaining that most
environmental laws are not “entirely strict,” because often “some factual knowledge is necessary”).
30. 16 U.S.C. § 707(a) (2006).
31. See David M. Uhlmann, After the Spill Is Gone: The Gulf of Mexico, Environmental Crime,
and the Criminal Law, 109 MICH. L. REV. 1413, 1417 (2011) (suggesting that any MBTA charge
against BP would be a “strict liability offense that was committed as soon as oil from the spill coated
migratory birds”); see also infra Part III.A. But see infra Part III.B (discussing cases in which courts
have not tied the strict liability nature of the MBTA to unintentional corporate actors).
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If read broadly, the MBTA is not restricted to hunting and
conservation regulation. Indeed, its application to broader areas has
boomed since the 1970s, when it was first applied beyond its traditional
hunting and preservation framework.32 In the 1970s, prosecutors began
charging oil companies for bird deaths that resulted from oil sludge
pits33—similar to the charges brought in Brigham Oil.34 Courts have
recognized that some environmental statutes should be read broadly.35
However, courts’ broad-sweeping readings of environmental statutes are
often associated with environmental statutes that are remedial36—i.e.,
statutes that are “protective in nature”37 or designed to ensure and
safeguard the public health and welfare.38 Statutes that are penal in
nature or that take away any substantive rights are not considered
remedial.39 In contrast to remedial statutes, penal statutes should be
32. See Fjetland, supra note 21, at 51.
33. See United States v. Union Tex. Petrol., 73-CR-127, 1973 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15616 (D.
Colo. July 11, 1973); United States v. Stuarco Oil Co., 73-CR-129, 1973 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15616
(D. Colo., Aug. 17, 1973); Fjetland, supra note 21, at 51.
34. See discussion of Brigham Oil infra Part III.
35. See United States v. Gen. Battery Corp., Inc., 423 F.3d 294, 297 (3d Cir. 2005) (noting that
CERCLA is a “‘sweeping’ federal remedial statute” that is designed to be broadly applied across the
hazardous substance landscape); see also United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 56 n.1 (1998)
(recognizing CERCLA’s “sweeping” application); Richard A. Smolen, Note, Get the Lead Out:
Innocent Successor Corporations Responsibility Under CERCLA—United States v. General Battery
Corp., Inc., 423 F.3d 294 (3d Cir. 2005), 25 TEMP. J. SCI. TECH. & ENVTL. L. 137, 147–48 (2006).
36. See, e.g., Scott D. Deatherage, Environmental Law, 64 SMU L. REV. 239, 241 (2011);
Blake A. Watson, Liberal Construction of CERCLA Under the Remedial Purpose Cannon: Have the
Lower Courts Taken a Good Thing Too Far?, 20 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 199 (1996); see also
Lawrence M. Solan, Statutory Inflation and Institutional Choice, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2209,
2211–12 (2003) (noting that one longstanding canon of statutory construction is to read remedial
statutes broadly).
37. Watson, supra note 36, at 236.
38. See Deatherage, supra note 36, at 241. Many environmental provisions fit well with the
public welfare doctrine. A “public welfare offense” is a “minor offense that involves no moral
delinquency, being intended only to secure the effective regulation of conduct in the interest of the
community.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1110 (7th ed. 1999). If the MBTA fell under the public
welfare doctrine, it would likely be broadly read and strict liability would be favored. See Andrew H.
Costinett et al., Environmental Crimes, 47 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 441, 506 (2010). However, the
MBTA’s purpose does not fit the definition of a public welfare offense; rather, the MBTA was
designed to curb unethical hunting and poaching practices in light of bird conservation. See infra text
accompanying note 163. Thus, even though the MBTA at its heart seeks to conserve wildlife, the
traditional MBTA violations—unethical hunting—contain an element of moral delinquency not
often considered part of public welfare offenses, and section 707 is designed to punish, not
remediate. For an opinion that the purely strict liability nature of the MBTA fits squarely within the
public welfare realm, see Kalyani Robbins, Paved with Good Intentions: The Fate of Strict Liability
Under the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 42 ENVTL. L. 579 (2012).
39. Watson, supra note 36, at 233–34 (suggesting that statutes containing criminal provisions
have purposes inapposite to remedial statutes); see also Charles T. Wells & Allen Winsor,
Apportionment from Hoffman v. Jones Through the 2011 Legislative Session: Perfecting the
Equation of Liability with Fault, TRIAL ADVOCATE Q., Winter 2012, at 29, 32 (“Remedial statutes
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interpreted narrowly.40 Arguably, the MBTA should be read narrowly, as
a penal statute, because it was designed to punish those violating its
provisions with prison time or fines, rather than encourage any remedial
measures.41 The MBTA could also be considered remedial, however,
because it is geared toward protecting wildlife and could slip into the
realm of broadly applied public welfare statutes.42 The MBTA’s
punishment-and-protection dual nature reaffirms the confusion over how
its terms should be read—broadly versus narrowly.
Finally, one unique and important litigation-based component to the
MBTA is that it does not contain a citizens suit provision. This limits
who can bring suit alleging MBTA violations. Most federal
environmental laws employ citizens suit provisions43—or private causes
of action to enforce environmental statutes, brought by private attorneys
general44—but the MBTA contains no private cause of action.45 Without
the potential for citizen enforcement, state and federal prosecutors are
left to decide whether entities that take or kill listed birds should be held
accountable. The USFWS may offer referrals or guidance to prosecutors
over whether to bring MBTA charges,46 but it is the prosecutors who
are those which do not create new or take away vested rights, but only operate in furtherance of the
remedy or confirmation of rights already existing.” (internal quotes omitted)).
40. Solan, supra note 36, at 2212.
41. 16 U.S.C. § 707(a)–(b) (2006). The prison time can reach significant levels too, due to the
potential accumulation of counts (at six months per bird for misdemeanors, and two years per bird
for felonies). See id.
42. See supra text accompanying note 38.
43. See, e.g., RICHARD J. LAZARUS, THE MAKING OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 189–91 (2004);
Jonathan H. Adler, Stand or Deliver: Citizens Suits, Standing, and Environmental Protection, 12
DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 39, 42 (2001) (“Most major federal environmental laws contain citizensuit provisions. As a result, environmental citizen suits are now a central element of American
environmental law.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
44. See LAZARUS, supra note 43, at 189–91.
45. See Flint Hills Tallgrass Heritage Charity Found., Inc. v. Scottish Power, PLC, 147 Fed.
App’x 785, 786–87 (10th Cir. 2005) (rejecting private cause of action by citizens group against wind
farm that was unintentionally killing birds); Lilley & Firestone, supra note 18, at 1195–96 (noting
that the MBTA is “‘solely the province of the federal government’” (quoting Beveridge, supra note
11, at 38)).
46. The USFWS, a division of the U.S. Department of the Interior, is the federal agency
delegated regulatory power over the MBTA. 16 U.S.C. § 704 (2006); Exec. Order No. 13,186, 66
Fed. Reg. 3853, § 3 (Jan. 10, 2001); see also NAT’L PARK SERV. & U.S. FISH AND WILDLIFE SERV.,
Memorandum of Understanding Between the U.S. Dep’t of the Interior Nat’l Park Serv. and the U.S.
Fish and Wildlife Serv. to Promote the Conservation of Migratory Birds (2010), available at
http://www.fws.gov/migratorybirds/Partnerships/NPSEO13186Signed%204.12.10.pdf (“The FWS is
legally mandated to implement the conservation provisions of the MBTA, which include
responsibilities for managing bird populations; domestic and international coordination; and the
development and enforcement of regulations. The Migratory Bird Conservation Act and the Fish and
Wildlife Coordination Act mandate migratory bird habitat conservation, which includes habitat
protection through acquisition, enhancement, and/or management to avoid and minimize impacts.”);
PETER ASMUS, REAPING THE WIND: HOW MECHANICAL WIZARDS, VISIONARIES, AND PROFITEERS
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decide unintentional corporate actors’ MBTA fate, and this includes
prosecutors’ decisions whether to bring charges against the wind
industry.
B. Wind Farms, the Death of Birds, and MBTA Application
Wind-energy companies fall under the MBTA’s scope because
wind farms kill birds and the plain language of the MBTA ropes in
incidental actions of “associations, partnerships, and corporations.”47
Wind energy has many environmental benefits, but U.S. wind farms
incidentally account for approximately 300,000 to 400,000 annual bird
deaths.48 Reports show that turbine-related deaths have increased over
the last decade49—and it is logical that the number of annual deaths will
continue increase as wind-farm development continues.50
The wind-energy era began in the 1980s,51 and is considered an
ecological and environmental supplement—and in some ways
replacement—to the worldwide dependence on fossil fuels.52 This
understanding (and more notably the hope for replacement) is held
primarily by environmentalists.53 But the desire for efficient and
HELPED SHAPE OUR ENERGY FUTURE 138 (2001) (identifying that the USFWS has been delegated
regulatory authority over the MBTA).
47. As analyzed in Part III, not every judge has read the MBTA to apply to unintentional
corporate actors. However, the plain language of the MBTA logically makes any “association,
partnership, or corporation” liable for MBTA violations, regardless of intent.
48. Joseph G. Block & Lewis J. Taylor, The Migratory Bird Treaty Act: The Stealth
Environmental Law, in WHITE COLLAR CRIME, at V-27, V-32 (ABA Institute ed., 2011); Urbanski,
supra note10.
49. In 2002 the USFWS reported an estimate of 33,000, but since then the USFWS has
reported estimates nearing annual deaths of 440,000. Compare Manville, supra note 10, at 268, with
U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., MIGRATORY BIRD MORTALITY (2002), available at
http://www.fws.gov/birds/mortality-fact-sheet.pdf.
50. VAUGHN NELSON, WIND ENERGY: RENEWABLE ENERGY AND THE ENVIRONMENT 221–22
(2009) (suggesting that wind energy will continue to grow, that landowners are increasingly
“harvest[ing] the wind,” and that “wind energy will [soon] be the most cost-competitive power
source on the market”); Manville, supra note 10, at 267 (reporting that the number of wind turbines
on the U.S. landscape could grow from roughly 23,000 to more than 155,000 by 2020); Thure Traber
& Claudie Kemfert, Gone With the Wind? Electricity Market Prices and Incentives to Invest in
Thermal Power Plants Under Increasing Wind Energy Supply, 33 ENERGY ECON. 249, 249 (2011)
(noting that research predicts a 25% annual increase in installed wind power through 2015). But see
Kathleen Hunter, Wind Energy Should Mull Tax Credit Phase Out, Baucus Says, BLOOMBERG
BUSINESSWEEK (Mar. 20, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-03-20/wind-industryshould-consider-tax-credit-phase-out-baucus-says.html (reporting that U.S. senators have pushed to
phase out wind-energy tax credits, which could result in less turbine production).
51. NELSON, supra note 50, at 216–19; ION BOGDAN VASI, WINDS OF CHANGE: THE
ENVIRONMENTAL MOVEMENT AND THE GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE WIND ENERGY INDUSTRY
3, 17 (2011). Despite its late arrival, wind power became the fastest growing source of energy during
the mid-1990s. VASI, supra, at 24.
52. VASI, supra note 51, at 99–101.
53. Id. at 13.
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environmentally friendly energy production has global outreach. Indeed,
the wind industry is often influenced by international organizations and
agreements that seek uniform energy production methods, such as the
Kyoto Protocol.54
The wind industry’s global connection makes even more prominent
the fact that wind farms have collided with American wildlife.55
Coincidentally, the century-old MBTA is positioned perfectly to hold
wind farms accountable for their incidental takings and killings of
migratory birds. Each time a wind turbine kills a migratory bird, the
association, partnership, or corporation that operates that turbine has
arguably violated MBTA section 703(a). Even if the bird death was
unintentional, a plain reading of section 703(a) ropes in the turbine
operator because section 703(a) states that it “shall be unlawful at any
time, by any means or in any manner,” to take or kill a migratory bird.56
When a turbine operator violates section 703(a), section 707(a) makes
the operator liable for a misdemeanor (and a $15,000 per-death fine or
six-month prison term) because, as section 707(a) sets forth, the operator
would have violated “any provision” of the MBTA.57 A plain reading of
the MBTA makes white collar criminals out of wind-farm operators that
accidentally kill birds.
However, wind-farm operators are not being prosecuted despite
their apparent MBTA liability.58 It is arguable that prosecutors are
executing good policy by side-stepping the MBTA violations committed
by wind farms. Wind farms provide significant environmental benefits,
which arguably outweigh any resulting wildlife damage, even if the
wildlife damage at a certain wind farm may be more than 5,000

54. Id. at 39. See generally Press Release, EWEA, Kyoto Protocol: Wind Power Is Essential
for
Any
Government’s
Top
5
‘Climate
To-Do’
List
(Feb. 2005),
http://www2.ewea.org/documents/050216%20Kyoto%20signing%20FINAL.pdf (reporting the
Kyoto Protocol’s recognition of “wind power [as] one of the leading global solutions to tackl[ing]
climate change”). The United States never signed the Kyoto Protocol. However, the Protocol’s
influence on American wind-energy production still helped shape federal wind energy polices
(notably, the creation of one federal tax credit policy crediting the construction of turbines that
existed through the mid-2000s). VASI, supra note 51, at 101.
55. The bird-death problem itself is a global one. European counties are experiencing backlash
against wind farms as well, in response to a growing awareness that wind farms pose a threat to
migrating birds. See, e.g., Press Release, Spanish Soc’y of Ornithology (SEO/Birdlife), Spanish
Wind Farms Kill 6 to 18 Million Birds & Bats a Year (Jan. 14, 2012), available at
http://savetheeaglesinternational.org/?page_id=770.
56. 16 U.S.C. § 703(a) (2006) (emphasis added).
57. See id. § 707(a).
58. See, e.g., Robert Bryce, Windmills vs. Birds, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 7, 2012),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204781804577267114294838328.html.
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migratory bird deaths per year.59 Moreover, not only are the deaths by
wind-farm operators unintentional, but the number is minuscule
compared to the overall amount of birds killed by other facets of our
society, such as cars or buildings.60 In any event, the refusal of
prosecutors to charge wind farmers is contrary to the wildlifeconservation policy at the heart of the MBTA.61
Other industries have not been as fortunate when it comes to
prosecution. Notably, oil and gas companies and pesticide manufacturers
and distributors have been subject to MBTA prosecution in a handful of
cases since the 1970s.62 This shows that the MBTA lacks uniform
enforcement by prosecutors: One type of entity arguably escapes liability
because of its function (in this case, the wind-energy industry), whereas
others are punished or sought to be punished. The next Part details cases
where U.S. attorney’s brought MBTA charges against other industries.
III. FEDERAL MBTA PROSECUTION OF COMMERCIAL ENTITIES FOR
INCIDENTAL BIRD DEATHS
The recent decision by the North Dakota U.S. Attorney to prosecute
the companies in Brigham Oil63 has been criticized for being an unfair
act toward oil companies.64 But the decision to prosecute in Brigham Oil
was not necessarily unprecedented. Since the 1960s, corporate entities
have been prosecuted under the MBTA for the incidental taking or
59. Some commentators argue that the bird deaths created by wind farms are menial in the big
picture and any detriment wind farms cause to wildlife is outweighed by wind-energy’s significant
environmental impacts. See, e.g., Pros and Cons of Wind Power, Turbines and Farms—The
Advantages Outweigh the Disadvantages, GREEN WORLD INVESTOR (Mar. 13, 2011),
http://www.greenworldinvestor.com/2011/03/13/pros-and-cons-of-wind-powerturbines-and-farmsthe-advantages-outweighs-the-disadvantages/ (suggesting wind industry’s low cost and clean energy
as benefits outweighing, among other things, wildlife deaths); Wind Energy, ALTERNATIVE ENERGY,
http://www.altenergy.org/renewables/wind.html (last visited Apr. 14, 2012).
60. IMPACTS OF WIND-ENERGY PROJECTS, supra note 1, at 71–72 (noting that buildings kill an
estimated 50 million birds annually, and cars an estimated 80 million).
61. McKinsey, supra note 11, at 80 (suggesting that current energy policy and wind-farm avian
impacts are in confrontation with the MBTA’s principles); see also Perkins, supra note 22, at 822
(noting that the main policy behind the MBTA is bird-species preservation).
62. See infra Part III. For a persuasive examination of this controversial discrepancy, see
Gaynor et al., supra note 14.
63. United States v. Brigham Oil & Gas L.P., 840 F. Supp. 2d 1202 (D.N.D 2012).
64. Bastasch, supra note 14 (quoting Robert Bryce of the Manhattan Institute: “There is a
pernicious double standard here.”); Letter from Newt Gingrich, supra note 8; Kate Bommarito,
Senator Inhofe: Justice Department Prosecution of Oil Companies “An Attack” on Oil,
PLAINSDAILY,
http://plainsdaily.com/entry/senator-inhofe-obama-administration-will-stop-atnothing-to-bring-down-us-fossil-fuel-producers/ (Aug. 29, 2011) (describing Oklahoma Senator Jim
Inhofe’s belief that the Brigham Oil case was another example of disfavor toward oil companies);
Steve McGough, Oil & Gas Companies Prosecuted for Bird Deaths . . . Wind Turbine Companies
Not as Much, RADIOVICEONLINE (Feb. 20, 2012), http://radioviceonline.com/oil-gas-companiesprosecuted-for-bird-deaths-wind-turbine-companies-not-so-much/.
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killing of migratory birds in a variety of settings. Many instances
involved oil companies, where birds accidentally plunged into oil pits or
oil equipment and became trapped.65 However, power-line operators,
pesticide companies, farmers, and timber operations have also been
subjected to MBTA violations.66
Even though the plain language of the MBTA holds all parties,
including “associations, partnerships, and corporations,”67 strictly liable
for violating any MBTA provision, different judges have had differing
opinions about whether the MBTA criminal provisions apply to
unintentional corporate actors. Some judges have exempted unintentional
corporate actors, carving-out an exception,68 which has created a circuit
split over how the MBTA is interpreted. This Part discusses the varying
interpretations of MBTA criminal provisions according to different U.S.
circuit and district courts, starting with courts that found unintentional
corporate actors strictly liable under the MBTA.
A. MBTA Cases Where Strict Liability Was Found
Judges have applied the MBTA’s criminal provisions to
unintentional corporate actors in courts within the United States Courts
of Appeals for the Second, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits.69 The first

65. See, e.g., United States v. Apollo Energies, Inc., 611 F.3d 679 (10th Cir. 2010) (birds
caught in oil “heat-treater”); Brigham Oil, 840 F. Supp. 2d at 1203 (birds caught in oil pits); United
States v. Chevron USA, Inc., No. 09-CR-0132, 2009 WL 364517 (W.D. La. Oct. 30, 2009) (birds
found in open caisson); United States v. Union Texas Petrol., No. 73-CR-127 (D. Colo. July 11,
1973) (birds landed in oil pits); United States v. Stuarco Oil Co., No. 73-CR-129 (D. Colo. Aug. 17,
1953) (birds landed in oil pits). The Union Texas and Stuarco, cases were never reported, and Union
Texas never even went to trial, so even though MBTA charges were brought in these three cases,
they are unhelpful for determining the MBTA’s application to unintentional corporate actors. See
Lilley & Firestone, supra note 18, at 1182 (“It is difficult to determine the exact significance of these
[three] decisions, as they were ‘not officially reported.’”). The Chevron case, also not reported,
involved a guilty plea later flipped on its head by a federal judge utilizing the seldom-used rule of
lenity. The judge’s reasoning included that the defendants thought they were—indeed, they were—
performing perfectly legal activity by installing the caisson. See Chevron, 2009 WL 364517, *4;
Gaynor et al. supra note 14, at B-6.
66. See, e.g., United States v. FMC Corp., 428 F. Supp. 615 (W.D.N.Y. 1977) (chemical
company discharging pesticide); United States v. Corbin Farm Serv., 444 F. Supp. 510 (E.D. Cal.
1978) (pesticide manufacturer); United States v. Moon Lake Elec. Assoc., Inc., 45 F. Supp. 2d 1070,
1071 (D. Colo. 1999) (electricity provider); United States v. Rollins, 706 F. Supp. 742 (D. Idaho
1989) (alfalfa farmer); Newton Cnty. Wildlife Assoc. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 113 F.3d 110, 115 (8th
Cir. 1997) (timber sale operation); Mahler v. U.S. Forest Serv., 927 F. Supp. 1559 (S.D. Ind. 1996)
(timber sale operation).
67. 16 U.S.C. § 707(a) (2006).
68. See cases discussed infra Part III.B.
69. See United States v. FMC Corp., 428 F. Supp. 615 (W.D.N.Y. 1977); United States v.
Corbin Farm Serv., 444 F. Supp. 510 (E.D. Cal. 1978); United States v. Moon Lake Elec. Assoc.,
Inc., 45 F. Supp. 2d 1070 (D. Colo. 1999).

2013]

The Prosecutor’s Vulture

15

occurrence was in 1977, in United States v. FMC Corp.70 In FMC, a
chemical company was charged and convicted under section 703 of the
MBTA for killing ninety-two birds after the company “discharged [a
known toxic] pesticide into a nearby settling pond.”71 In holding FMC
strictly liable under the MBTA, the court stated,
[I]mplementation of the statute will involve only relatively minor
fines; Congress recognized the important public policy behind protecting migratory birds; FMC engaged in an activity involving the
manufacture of a highly toxic chemical; and FMC failed to prevent
this chemical from escaping into the pond and killing birds. This is
sufficient to impose strict liability on FMC.72

In addition to the MBTA’s broad statutory language, the FMC court
found strict liability appropriate because of the U.S. public policy in
protecting migratory birds and the relatively small fines.73 Ultimately,
FMC started a trend of cases holding commercial entities strictly liable
under the MBTA for unintentionally killing migratory birds.
Shortly after FMC was decided, the Eastern District of California
imposed MBTA strict liability on a pesticides dealer in United States v.
Corbin Farm Service.74 In Corbin Farm, 1,000 migratory birds had died;
however, in contrast to the multiple counts imposed in FMC, the Corbin
Farm court imposed just one count of MBTA violations, reasoning that
Congress had not expressly provided through the statute’s language that
multiple counts were an option.75 Strict liability was still found despite
no intentional taking or killing of birds. The court ran through the
MBTA’s history, noting that it was created in 1918 and designed to
“sav[e] from indiscriminate slaughter of and insur[e] the preservation of
such migratory birds” that were listed in conjunction with the Act.76 But
despite that it felt Congress was concerned primarily with hunting when
the MBTA was first enacted, the court said that the legislative history
gave no implication that the Act was meant to be so limited.77
70. 428 F. Supp. 615 (W.D.N.Y. 1977), aff’d, 572 F.2d 902 (2d Cir. 1978).
71. FMC Corp., 572 F.2d at 907–08; Lilley & Firestone, supra note 18, at 1182.
72. 572 F.2d at 908.
73. Id.
74. 444 F. Supp. 510 (E.D. Cal. 1978).
75. Id. at 531 (“This court cannot find that Congress has provided ‘clearly and without
ambiguity’ for multiple counts in prosecutions under the MBTA in circumstances of this case.
Accordingly, nine of the ten counts brought against defendants . . . under the MBTA are
dismissed.”).
76. Id. at 530 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 243, pmbl., 65th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1918)).
77. Id. at 532. In fact, the court mentioned that a number of birds protected by the MBTA are
not hunted birds, notably a variety of songbirds. Id. Arguably, the continued inclusion of un-hunted
birds or birds at risk on the MBTA’s list of protected birds suggests that the purpose of the Act, even
if not the case in 1918, stems well beyond just hunting regulation. See generally Birds Protected by
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The District of Colorado followed form in 1999.78 In United States
v. Moon Lake Electric Assoc., an “electrical distribution cooperative”
that provided power to an oil field was charged with MBTA violations
for the unintentional “taking and killing” of seventeen protected birds.79
The Moon Lake court noted that “the MBTA does not seem overly
concerned with how captivity, injury, or death occurs.”80 The court
further noted that, “in drafting the MBTA, Congress did not include any
language that would suggest it intended to punish only those who act
with specific motives.”81 Furthermore, the court asserted that Congress
amended the MBTA after the Corbin Farm and FMC decisions, in
1986,82 and could have altered it to not apply to unintentional acts, but
Congress chose not to make those changes.83 Thus, the Moon Lake court
followed form from FMC and Corbin Farm in holding a commercial
entity strictly liable for unintentionally killing and taking listed birds.84
Following Moon Lake, owners of oil drilling devices were
prosecuted in a Tenth Circuit district for MBTA violations, and this time
the case reached the appellate level.85 The defendants in United States v.
Apollo Energies were convicted of section 707(a) misdemeanors and
fined a combined $1,750 after the USFWS found ten protected birds
dead in their equipment.86 The defendants challenged the convictions,
alleging that the MBTA did not maintain a strict liability provision and
the
Migratory
Bird
Treaty
Act,
USFWS,
http://www.fws.gov/migratorybirds/RegulationsPolicies/mbta/mbtandx.html#alpha1 (last visited
Apr. 2, 2012).
78. See United States v. Moon Lake Elec. Assoc., 45 F. Supp. 2d 1070 (D. Colo. 1999).
79. Id. at 1071.
80. Id. at 1074.
81. Id. at 1075.
82. Emergency Wetlands Resources Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-645, 100 Stat. 3582 (1986).
83. Moon Lake, 45 F. Supp. 2d at 1077. In fact, the MBTA was amended in 1986 to include a
knowledge element, adding the term “knowingly” to the felony violation, but the misdemeanor
provision was left untouched. See § 501, 100 Stat. at 3582; Collette L. Adkins Giese, Spreading Its
Wings: Using the Migratory Bird Treaty Act to Protect Habitat, 36 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1157,
1173–74 (2010) (suggesting that “[i]f Congress wanted to alter the strict liability scheme for
misdemeanors, Congress would have added the term ‘knowingly’ to section 707(a)” and not just
section 707(b)).
84. The Moon Lake court did add one component, which it claimed prior cases neglected:
“[T]o obtain a guilty verdict under § 707(a), the government must prove proximate causation . . . .”
See Moon Lake, 45 F. Supp. 2d at 1085 (emphasis added); see also Lilley & Firestone, supra note
18, at 1183–86 (comparing the FMC, Corbin Farm, and Moon Lake cases, among others). Even with
the Moon Lake proximate cause addition, wind farms that do not take reasonable caution to prevent
bird deaths would be potentially liable for MBTA liability because statistics suggest that wind
projects are likely to result in at least some avian fatalities. See MARKIAN M.W. MELNYK & ROBERT
M. ANDERSEN, OFFSHORE POWER: BUILDING RENEWABLE ENERGY PROJECTS IN U.S. WATERS 205–
06 (2009) (analyzing Moon Lake in the context of wind farms).
85. United States v. Apollo Energies, Inc., 611 F.3d 679 (10th Cir. 2010).
86. Id. at 682.
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that, alternatively, if it maintained strict liability, the MBTA would be
unconstitutional.87 The Apollo court used previous Tenth Circuit case law
to reason that strict liability was a component of the MBTA’s criminal
provisions.88 The court asserted as follows: “The question here is
whether unprotected oil field equipment can take or kill migratory birds.
It is obvious the oil equipment can.”89 The court found that unintentional
actions of oil operators properly lead to MBTA prosecution for taking or
killing listed birds.90
As can be seen from the above cases, the application of MBTA
criminal prosecution to unintentional corporate actors has expanded
across multiple jurisdictions, even if those jurisdictions did not interpret
the statute the same way.91 Other U.S. circuit and district courts have
gone the complete opposite direction by not finding strict liability at all.
Wind-farm operators that unintentionally kill migratory birds would not
be subject to MBTA criminal liability in the jurisdictions where the
following cases were decided.
B. Brigham Oil and Similar MBTA Cases Where Strict Liability Was Not
Found
The 2012 District of North Dakota decision in United States v.
Brigham Oil & Gas L.P. evidences the circuit split on whether
unintentional corporate actors should be held strictly liable for MBTA
violations. The Brigham Oil defendants consisted of seven oil and gas
companies based out of North Dakota.92 The seven companies committed
a combined “taking” of twenty-seven birds, found dead near the
defendants’ oil reserve pits.93 The companies were investigated by a
Special Agent for the USFWS, who had observed “oil sheens” on the
reserve pits and dead mallards that were “oiled.”94 The companies were
subsequently charged in federal court with MBTA section 707(a)
misdemeanors for “taking” migratory birds, pursuant to MBTA section
87. Id.
88. Id. at 684–88 (relying on United States v. Corrow, 119 F.3d 796 (10th Cir. 1997), which
found an individual strictly liable under the MBTA for possessing and selling Golden Eagle and
Great-Horned Owl feathers).
89. Id. at 686.
90. Id.
91. For example, Corbin Farm differed from FMC by finding a “one count” limit regardless of
how many birds were killed, and Moon Lake incorporated a proximate cause analysis. See supra text
accompanying notes 75, 84.
92. United States v. Brigham Oil & Gas, L.P., 840 F. Supp. 2d 1202, 1203 (D.N.D. 2012).
93. Defendant’s Brigham and Newfield’s Joint Memorandum of Law in Support of Motions to
Dismiss Informations at 2 n.1, United States v. Brigham Oil & Gas, L.P., 840 F. Supp. 2d 1202
(D.N.D. 2012) (Nos. 11-PO-005-CSM-1, 11-PO-009-CSM-1), 2011 WL 6258226 at *2 n.1.
94. Brigham Oil, 840 F. Supp. 2d at 1205.
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703.95 Contrary to previous case law in other jurisdictions,96 the North
Dakota district judge dismissed the case.97 The judge reasoned that
“[j]ust as in the case of driving, flying, or farming, the Migratory Bird
Treaty Act cannot reasonably be read to criminalize the legal operation
of a reserve pit at an oil exploration site.”98 The judge was concerned that
reading the MBTA too broadly created “unlimited potential for criminal
prosecution,”99 and he argued that criminalizing commercial activity
through the MBTA “stretche[d] far beyond the bounds of reason.”100
The Brigham Oil outcome is not so surprising when considering the
few MBTA cases involving corporate activity where defendants’ motions
to dismiss were actually granted. In fact, the Brigham Oil court relied in
large part on Eighth Circuit precedent holding that the strict liability
portions of the MBTA applied only to hunters and poachers.101
In the 1997 Eighth Circuit case Newton County Wildlife Assoc. v.
United States Forest Service, the Newton County Wildlife Association
(NCWA) sued the United States Forest Service (USFS) because it
wanted judicial review of four timber sales, alleging MBTA violations
by the parties to the timber sales.102 NCWA sought an injunction to halt
the sales, and it argued that the USFS’ approval of sales was “contrary to
law because [the USFS] ignored or violated its obligations under
MBTA.”103 Notably, NCWA argued that the logging necessary for the
timber sales would “disrupt nesting, migratory birds killing some,” thus
violating MBTA section 703.104 However, the court disagreed with
NCWA, reasoning that “it would stretch [the] 1918 statute far beyond the
bounds of reason to construe it as an absolute criminal prohibition on
conduct, such as timber harvesting, that indirectly results in the death of
migratory birds.”105 The Newton court restricted the application of the

95. Id. at 1204.
96. See case discussions supra Part III.A.
97. Brigham Oil, 840 F. Supp. 2d at 1214.
98. Id. at 1213.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 1214.
101. See id. at 1211 (citing Newton Cnty. Wildlife Assoc. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 113 F.3d 110,
115 (8th Cir. 1997)).
102. Newton, 113 F.3d at 112.
103. Id. at 114.
104. Id. at 115.
105. Id. The court cited cases from other jurisdictions as support for its assertion that “take”
and “kill” meant actions of the sort taken by the hunters and poachers considered when the MBTA
was adopted in 1918. Id. (citing Seattle Audubon Soc’y v. Evans, 952 F.2d 297, 302 (9th Cir. 1991);
accord Mahler v. U.S. Forest Serv., 927 F. Supp. 1559, 1573–74 (S.D. Ind. 1996); Citizens
Interested in Bull Run, Inc. v. Edrington, 781 F. Supp. 1502, 1509–10 (D. Or. 1991)).
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MBTA to unintentional corporate actors because it felt such an
application would be too broad an interpretation of the ancient Act.106
It is arguable that Brigham Oil is distinguishable from Newton and
thus the Brigham Oil judge should not have relied on Newton. Newton
involved claims against a federal agency, whereas Brigham Oil was a
criminal prosecution of private entities. The Newton events were indeed
part of a larger, public–private forestry operation. Brigham Oil involved
purely private enterprise. Still, the Newton reasoning was that strict
liability should apply only to hunting- and poaching-type activities, not
commercial enterprise.107 Thus, it would seem, Brigham Oil and Newton
consistently establish that in North Dakota and in the Eighth Circuit
generally, unintentional corporate actors are free from federal court
MBTA criminal prosecution.
The USFS was prosecuted based on alleged MBTA violations again
in Mahler v. United States Forest Service, a Southern District of Indiana
case.108 In Mahler, birds never actually perished; rather, MBTA charges
were filed under the allegation that the USFS’ planned harvest of red
pine trees constituted a “taking” of migratory birds.109 The Mahler court
supported a narrow reading of the MBTA similar to the reading in
Newton.110 The Mahler court based its reasoning on the belief that the
“MBTA was designed to forestall hunting of migratory birds and the sale
of their parts,” and ultimately the court declined that the USFS’ action
could be subject to criminal suit under the MBTA.111 The court did not
accept a strict-liability MBTA reading for indirect taking,112 and its
exception seems carved-out of legislative history even more than the
exception carved-out by the Newton and Brigham Oil courts. The
Newton and Brigham Oil judges were more concerned about an overly
broad application of the MBTA, whereas Judge Hamilton, in Mahler,
was concerned with the “Congressional purpose behind its enactment.”113
Strict liability likewise was not applied to the defendant in United
States v. Rollins, a District of Idaho case decided in 1989.114 In Rollins,
the defendant farmer had applied a pesticide mixture to fifty acres of

106. It is worth noting also that the Newton court held that the USFS was outside the MBTA’s
reach because a governmental agency cannot be a “person, association, partnership, or corporation.”
113 F.3d at 115.
107. See id.
108. 927 F. Supp. 1559 (S.D. Ind. 1996).
109. Id. at 1573.
110. Lilley & Firestone, supra note 18, at 1184.
111. 927 F. Supp. at 1574.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. 706 F. Supp. 742 (D. Idaho 1989).
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alfalfa crop, and inadvertently killed a flock of geese.115 The federal
prosecutors argued that the defendant should have known that his alfalfa
farm was a feeding area for geese, and that he should have been wary
that his pesticides could harm migratory birds.116 However, the district
court overturned a magistrate opinion that held Rollins liable under the
MBTA, finding that the MBTA did not give fair notice to Rollins that his
conduct could have been criminal under the Act.117 The court asserted
that “[t]he MBTA trapped a farmer who acted in good faith” and that the
MBTA could not constitutionally apply criminal violations to Rollins
because the MBTA was too vague on whether applying legal pesticide to
a field could be illegal conduct.118 Thus, toxic-substance poisoning by
Rollins, the farmer,119 did not result in MBTA strict liability just as the
oil-pit deaths did not create a strict liability crime in Brigham Oil.
Judges continue to disagree over whether strict liability under the
MBTA applies to commercial entities unintentionally taking or killing
migratory birds. Unless the Supreme Court of the United States grants
certiorari on an MBTA case, it is likely that some judges will continue to
carve-out exceptions for unintentional corporate actors in some circuits,
while judges in other circuits will find liable any commercial entity that
incidentally kills a migratory bird.
Whether a commercial wind-farm operator prosecuted for MBTA
violations would be found liable entirely depends on jurisdiction. Even
though wind farms would seem to violate the MBTA based on the plain
language of the statute,120 wind farms in North Dakota would seem to get
a pass because Brigham Oil held that “commercial entities” were not
meant to be subject to the MBTA, yet wind farms in Colorado would be
treated differently because the Tenth Circuit has read the MBTA in its
broadest possible form.
Wind-farm operators may never face the question of MBTA
applicability though, because they may never be prosecuted. The U.S.
judicial system embraces broad-sweeping prosecutorial discretion, so as
long as U.S. attorneys keep from prosecuting wind farms for bird deaths,
115. Id. at 743.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 744–45.
118. Id. For an opinion contrary to the Rollins judge, see Dennis Jenkins, Criminal Prosecution
and the Migratory Bird Treaty Act: An Analysis of the Constitution and Criminal Intent in an
Environmental Context, 24 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 595 (1997), arguing that there is “no merit to a
contention that the MBTA violates due process because it wholly criminalizes criminal behavior,”
and that the Supreme Court would be unlikely to infringe upon the MBTA’s legislatively induced
strict liability requirement.
119. See Lilley & Firestone, supra note 18, at 1191.
120. See supra Part II.B; see also McKinsey, supra note 11, at 78 (“Because the MBTA’s
scope is so expansive, its authority reaches probably every wind energy project.”).
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MBTA application will remain inconsistent across jurisdictions and
among different industry-types.
IV. PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION AND THE MBTA
The fact that wind-farm operators have never been prosecuted for
MBTA violations seems to be largely a component of prosecutorial
discretion. Indeed, the overall inconsistent and unpredictable MBTA
prosecution of unintentional corporate actors seems somewhat related to
prosecutorial picking and choosing. An argument can be made (and has
been made) that MBTA prosecution of certain industries, and not the
wind industry, is invalid selective enforcement.121 However, it is unlikely
that any selective enforcement argument would bear scrutiny because
companies (unless alleging discrimination based on race, gender, etc.,)
often have no basis for an equal protection claim,122 which is a necessary
component of a selective enforcement claim. U.S. prosecutors are given
a well-recognized level of discretion for choosing to bring claims, and
courts generally heed to that discretion.123
“The [ultimate] question of whether a corporation will be charged
and, if so, what crimes will be charged turns on the exercise of
prosecutorial discretion.”124 The MBTA is merely one of the many
statutes that prosecutors are armed with to decide the fate of potential
defendants (choosing, sometimes, at their whim, whether a certain party
deserve prosecution).125 Prosecutors may have a constitutionally limited

121. See, e.g., United States v. Corbin Farm Serv., 444 F. Supp. 510, 536–37 (E.D. Cal. 1978);
Letter from Newt Gingrich, supra note 8 (insisting that U.S. prosecutor decisions to prosecute oil
companies but not wind farms is a “clear abuse of the justice system”).
122. See Philip Weinberg, Equal Protection, in THE LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE:
THEORIES AND PROCEDURES TO ADDRESS DISPROPORTIONATE RISKS, 3 (Michael B. Gerrard &
Sheila R. Foster eds., 2008).
123. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 36 F. Supp. 2d 304 (E.D. Va. 1999) (acknowledging the
“presumption of regularly afforded prosecutorial discretion”); Victoria L. Killion, No Points for the
Assist? A Closer Look at the Role of Special Assistant United States Attorneys in the Cooperative
Model of Federal Prosecutions, 82 TEMP. L. REV. 789 (2009).
124. James Patrick Hanlon, Principles of Criminal Liability for Corporate Misconduct, in
PUNISHING CORPORATE CRIME: LEGAL PENALTIES FOR CRIMINAL AND REGULATORY VIOLATIONS
21, 26 (James T. O’Reilly et al. eds., 2009) [hereinafter PUNISHING CORPORATE CRIME].
125. See Anthony S. Barkow & Rachel E. Barkow, Introduction to PROSECUTORS IN THE
BOARDROOM: USING CRIMINAL LAW TO REGULATE CORPORATE CONDUCT 1, 1 (Anthony S.
Barkow & Rachel E. Barkow eds., 2011) [hereinafter PROSECUTORS IN THE BOARDROOM]; see also
N. Douglas Wells, Prosecution as an Administrative System: Some Fairness Concerns, 27 CAP. U.
L. REV. 841, 842 (1999) (noting that the federal prosecutor is an arm of the executive branch and
that “[t]he prosecutor decides what crimes to investigate, whom to charge with a particular offense,
which plea bargains to enter, when to seek an indictment, and when to prosecute”); Josh Bowers,
Legal Guilt, Normative Innocence, and the Equitable Decision Not to Prosecute, 110 COLUM. L.
REV. 1655, 1655 (2010) (describing that prosecutors are granted “a menu” of statutes to pick and
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role to effect the legislature’s polices, but prosecutors are arguably
legislating when they use their broad discretionary powers to decide
whether, and upon whom, to charge statutory violations.126 For example,
if prosecutors universally refrain from prosecuting the wind industry for
bird deaths, then they recreate the MBTA’s language to read, “any
person, association, partnership, or corporation [except for those within
the wind industry]”—even though that is not the language Congress
adopted. Prosecutorial discretion could be kept in check by guidance,
such as with the United States Attorneys’ Manual (USAM).
The USAM, set forth by the U.S. DOJ, administers prosecutorial
guidelines for deciding whether to charge corporations,127 but these
guidelines are not mandatory. The USAM guidelines are also not binding
in court—rather, they serve merely as the name would imply: as
guidance.128 The USAM sets forth that, before charging a corporation,
prosecutors must weigh “the nature and seriousness of the offense”129
and the “pervasiveness of wrongdoing within a corporation,”130 among
choose between for charging decisions (quoting Stephanos Bibas, Transparency and Participation in
Criminal Procedure, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 911, 932–33 (2006)).
126. See Barkow & Barkow, Introduction, supra note 125, at 1 (noting that “it is certainly not
the case today that prosecutors are merely enforcing preestablished rules”); Rachel E. Barkow, The
Prosecutor as Regulatory Agency, in PROSECUTORS IN THE BOARDROOM, supra note 125, at 177,
178–79 (“[A]djudicative and lawmaking activities . . . are becoming increasingly common in
prosecutors’ offices around the country.”); Austin Sarat & Conor Clarke, Beyond Discretion:
Prosecution, the Logic of Sovereignty, and the Limits of Law, 33 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 387, 391
(2008) (“By declining prosecution, even when there is probable cause, prosecutors have the power to
create exceptions to the reach of valid law—a power that signals the kind of lawlessness at the heart
of sovereignty.”). Some scholars point out that broadly written statutes present the best opportunities
for prosecutors to use their discretion to threaten prosecution or to choose one law over another in
charging a defendant. See Barkow, supra, at 178. The MBTA may be a tried and true example of
this—the MBTA’s “broad” and “vague” language has been recognized by many courts, see cases
discussed infra Part III.A, so broad language could also explain the inconsistent application of the
MBTA to some industries but not others.
127.
UNITED
STATES
ATTORNEY’S
MANUAL
ch. 9-28.000,
available
at
http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title9/28mcrm.htm
[hereinafter
USAM]; see also Hanlon, supra note 124, at 27–28; James Patrick Hanlon & Erin Reilly Lewis, The
Federal Criminal Investigation Process, in PUNISHING CORPORATE CRIME, supra note 124, at 67,
78–80.
128. See, e.g., San Pedro v. United States, 79 F.3d 1065, 1070 (11th Cir. 1996) (“It is well
established that the USAM only provides guidance to officials at the Department of Justice and does
not have the force of law.”); United States v. Carlson, 969 F.2d 1480, 1495 (3d Cir. 1992); Ellen S.
Podgor, Department of Justice Guidelines: Balancing “Discretionary Justice,” 13 CORNELL J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 167, 168 (2004). Administrative guidelines and manuals, though they would lack the
force of law and would not be granted complete deference by courts, “may merit some deference,”
and are entitled to respect and allowed the “power to persuade” a court. United States v. Mead Corp.,
533 U.S. 218, 220 (2003); Christensen v. Harris Cnty., 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000); Skidmore v. Swift
& Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944). For a look at the judicial deference afforded to federal decisions
whether to prosecute generally, see Wells, supra note 125, at 845–46.
129. 9 USAM §§ 28.300, 28.400.
130. Id. §§ 28.300, 28.500.
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seven other factors for consideration.131 However, a prosecutor bringing
charges against a corporation for MBTA violations need not consider
that the violations were relatively minor, that the bird death was
accidental, or that no component of the corporation was aware of
wrongdoing. In addition, the charging U.S. attorney need not consider
that a single wind farm may be responsible for thousands of annual bird
deaths,132 while a few oil companies, as in Brigham Oil, may be
collectively responsible for only a few dozen bird deaths.133 Likewise,
one prosecutor in a certain U.S. district could decide on a whim to
prosecute a wind farm for bird deaths, but a prosecutor in a different
district might find wind farms too socially and environmentally
beneficial, and thus, refuse to prosecute a wind farm killing just as many
birds.134
The existing USAM guidance does not fully limit the fact that
prosecutors have wide-ranging discretion for determining who to charge

131. See id. § 28.300; Hanlon, supra note 124, at 28. The complete factors are the following:
1.

the nature and seriousness of the offense, including the risk of harm to the public, and applicable policies and priorities, if any, governing the prosecution of
corporations for particular categories of crime (see USAM 9-28.400);
2.
the pervasiveness of wrongdoing within the corporation, including the complicity in, or the condoning of, the wrongdoing by corporate management (see
USAM 9-28.500);
3.
the corporation's history of similar misconduct, including prior criminal, civil,
and regulatory enforcement actions against it (see USAM 9-28.600);
4.
the corporation's timely and voluntary disclosure of wrongdoing and its willingness to cooperate in the investigation of its agents (see USAM 9-28.700);
5.
the existence and effectiveness of the corporation's pre-existing compliance
program (see USAM 9-28.800);
6.
the corporation's remedial actions, including any efforts to implement an effective corporate compliance program or to improve an existing one, to replace
responsible management, to discipline or terminate wrongdoers, to pay restitution, and to cooperate with the relevant government agencies (see USAM 928.900);
7.
collateral consequences, including whether there is disproportionate harm to
shareholders, pension holders, employees, and others not proven personally
culpable, as well as impact on the public arising from the prosecution (see
USAM 9-28.1000);
8.
the adequacy of the prosecution of individuals responsible for the corporation's
malfeasance; and
9.
the adequacy of remedies such as civil or regulatory enforcement actions (see
USAM 9-28.1100).
9 USAM §28.300(a).
132. See RIGHTER, supra note 12, at 106 (noting the 5,000-plus deaths occurring at Altamont
Pass in California).
133. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
134. Cf. Sarat & Clarke, supra note 126, at 391 (“A prosecutor might decline prosecution
because she feels that a suspect is not morally culpable . . . .”).
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with MBTA violations.135 And certainly prosecutors lack guidelines
specific to MBTA enforcement.136 This overall prosecutorial autonomy
makes it unpredictable whether MBTA violations might be brought in
given instances. Arguments have been made that prosecutor decisions to
withhold MBTA prosecution from wind-energy entities constitute
constitutionally invalid selective prosecution.137 However, selective
enforcement arguments carry little weight in the context of the MBTA.
For example, the defendant pesticides dealer in Corbin Farm138
argued prosecutorial misconduct as one defense against MBTA
application to his incidental killing of migratory birds.139 The Corbin
Farm defendant asserted that the MBTA had been “applied recently to an
arbitrarily selected few,” but that argument only captured a small
component of a selective prosecution claim.140 A defendant alleging
selective prosecution must also show that “his selection was based on an
impermissible ground such as race, religion, or his exercise of his first
amendment right to free speech.”141 Thus, it is quite clear that selective
prosecution arguments have no place in MBTA defenses based solely on
certain industry-types being prosecuted and not others.
Prosecutors seem to have “unfettered discretion”142 in deciding who
to sue under the MBTA. The application of the MBTA to some
industries, such as the oil companies in Brigham Oil, but not to windturbine operators, is a facet of prosecutorial discretion. The overarching
broad powers of prosecutors may never diminish. However, in light of
the current circuit split and ongoing, inconsistent MBTA prosecution,
either legislative change or alterations to how prosecutors bring MBTA
charges against unintentional corporate actors is necessary.143
135. See id.; Wells, supra note 125, at 842.
136. Robbins, supra note 38, at 605–07 (arguing that more specific MBTA enforcement
policies be implemented through regulations or, in the alternative, through written policy
statements).
137. See Letter from Newt Gingrich, supra note 8.
138. United States v. Corbin Farm Serv., 444 F. Supp. 510, 536–37 (E.D. Cal. 1978); see also
discussion of Corbin Farm supra Part III.A.
139. 444 F. Supp. at 536–37. Recall that the Corbin Farm defendant had applied a registered
pesticide to an alfalfa field, which resulted in numerous bird deaths after birds fed on the field. Id. at
515.
140. See id.
141. Id. (quoting United States v. Scott, 521 F.2d 1188, 1195 (9th Cir. 1975)); see also United
States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 463–64 (1996) (“A selective-prosecution claim is . . . an
independent assertion that the prosecutor has brought the charge for reasons forbidden by the
Constitution.”); Bowers, supra note 125, at 1659 n.13.
142. Bowers, supra note 125, at 1660; Sarat & Clarke, supra note 126, at 389 (noting that
some consider prosecutorial discretion bordering on “tyrannical power”).
143. Block & Taylor, supra note 48, at V-32 (“Relying on prosecutorial discretion is not an
adequate basis for decisions regarding significant allocations of capital and other resources. It is time
for the MBTA to be better defined so that everyone, from oil companies to alternative energy
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V. HOW DO WE REMEDY THE INCONSISTENT PROSECUTION OF
COMMERCIAL ENTITIES FOR MBTA VIOLATIONS?
The inconsistent MBTA application can be remedied best by an
approach that balances environmental accountability, fair prosecution,
and recognition of the MBTA’s purpose and benefits. There are many
benefits to the MBTA, with the most obvious being to protect United
States wildlife: the MBTA has an obvious purpose and impact on
preventing the destruction of birds by hunters or the loss of certain
endangered species,144 and through the MBTA, the USFWS is able to
enforce habitat preservation.145 The MBTA also holds accountable and
punishes intentional actors that wrongfully take advantage of protected
birds.146 In addition, it ensures that commercial entities are not
lackadaisical or apathetic toward wildlife. If, for example, oil companies
have not done their due diligence in protecting surrounding habitats and
wildlife from their facilities, the MBTA arguably becomes an
enforcement tool for prosecutors to ensure corporate accountability.
Indeed, corporations are more likely to comply with environmental laws
and ensure environmental accountability if criminal charges are
possible.147 The MBTA’s purpose in ensuring corporate environmental
awareness seems clear, but consistent and fair MBTA enforcement is just
as important.
When criminal charges are not applied consistently, statutes become
inherently unfair.148 In the instance of wind farms and corporations, there
is a circuit split as to whether the MBTA would even apply to
unintentional bird deaths, and prosecutor discretion has caused
inconsistent application over who the MBTA even relates to. Because the
MBTA has such strong policy implications regarding wildlife
preservation, its criminal provisions are necessary; however, the extent to
which unintentional corporate actors could be held liable for bird deaths
is debatable.
developers to farmers, will know what to do to comply with the MBTA, and that it is no longer the
stealth environmental law.”).
144. See Giese, supra note 83, at 1160–61.
145. See id.; Scott Finet, Habitat Protection and the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 10 TUL.
ENVTL. L.J. 1, 21–30 (1996) (detailing the MBTA’s “habitat preservation framework”).
146. See 16 U.S.C. § 707(b) (2006) (providing felony punishment for “whoever . . . knowingly
take[s] . . . or sell[s]” any migratory bird (emphasis added)); George Cameron Coggins & Sebastian
T. Patti, The Resurrection and Expansion of the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 50 U. COLO. L. REV.
165, 181–83 (1978) (explaining that the traditional MBTA criminal law focus is on prosecuting
illegal hunting, baiting, and possession of migratory birds).
147. Uhlmann, supra note 31, at 1443 (noting that the deterrent value of possible criminal
charges is higher).
148. See Gaynor et al., supra note 14, at B-9–B-10 (emphasizing the apparent unfairness, in the
MBTA context, when prosecutors pick and choose which industries should be subject to the Act).
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Some argue that environmental criminal prosecution should not
exist except for in instances involving “(1) significant harm or risk of
harm to the environment, or public health, (2) deceptive or misleading
conduct, (3) [facilities that] operate outside the environmental regulatory
system, or (4) significant and repetitive violations of environmental
laws.”149 Commercial entities that incidentally kill or take migratory
birds do not necessarily fall into any of these categories. Punishing
unintentional corporate actors under the MBTA may not effectively
further environmental policies because, relative to the amount of birds
dying from other human-related activities, companies causing incidental
bird deaths create limited environmental risk and/or wildlife harm.150
Moreover, unintentional corporate actors are generally not being
deceptive, and yet, despite the seemingly minor penalties of the
MBTA,151 these commercial entities could incur significant damages by
way of reputational harm.152 One bird death is arguably enough to
warrant a full-blown criminal investigation and punishment.153 But even
indictments for environmental crimes can bring public embarrassment
and suggest that the involved corporations are bad corporate actors.154
These consequences arguably outweigh any environmental policy
furthered by such stringent MBTA enforcement. A logical exception
could exist for repeat players—commercial entities with histories of
killing birds or of being apathetic toward their operations’ relationship to
surrounding wildlife—as they are likely more blameworthy and present
more risk to the environment.155 However, not all violators seem fit for
MBTA criminal prosecution.

149. David M. Uhlmann, Environmental Crime Comes of Age: The Evolution of Criminal
Enforcement in the Environmental Regulatory Scheme, 2009 UTAH L. REV. 1223, 1226 (2009).
150. The environmental harm caused by a limited number of bird deaths is arguably slim when
considering the number of incidental bird deaths that occur on an annual basis. See, e.g., IMPACTS OF
WIND-ENERGY PROJECTS, supra note 1, at 71–72 (detailing that millions of birds accidentally die
from human-related activities each year).
151. See generally James Patrick Hanlon, Criminal Statutory Liability and Interpretation, in
PUNISHING CORPORATE CRIME, supra note 122, at 47 (noting that strict liability penalties are more
tolerable where the penalties are small). The harm created by wind farms is especially slim to those
that find wind farms to have an inherent environmental value soaring beyond wind-energy’s
potential danger to wildlife. See sources cited supra note 59.
152. See, e.g., Spence, supra note 26, at 75.
153. The MBTA has held strong since 1918 that any single migratory bird death shall render
criminal liability. Migratory Bird Treaty Act, ch. 128, 40 Stat. 755 (1918). Therefore, just one bird
death may make prosecution worthwhile public policy.
154. See Joseph G. Block & David L. Feinberg, Look Before You Leap—DPAs, NPAs, and the
Environmental Criminal Case, 9 ENVTL. ENFORCEMENT & CRIMES COMM. NEWSLETTER 5 (2008).
155. United States v. FMC Corp., 428 F. Supp. 615, 618 (W.D.N.Y. 1977) (investigations
identified bird carcasses at multiple times before charges were brought).
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Fair enforcement of the MBTA should not be detrimental to
corporations not intending to violate the statute because it is unclear
whether Congress even intended for the MBTA to apply to corporations
(notably, wind farms).156 A judicial carve-out is an ill-fit fix to the
MBTA’s inconsistent application because carve-outs have already been
utilized by some courts, and MBTA application has simply been made
less uniform as a result.157 Industries that are subject to the MBTA based
on the MBTA’s text cannot wait for the United States Supreme Court to
grant certiorari to resolve whether strict liability applies to unintentional
corporate actors because it is too difficult to predict when (or even if) the
opportunity would arise. Ninety-four years have passed, and the Supreme
Court has hardly mentioned the MBTA.158 Much of the fighting has
occurred in the federal district courts.159 Whether the Supreme Court
could solve the issue would depend on another court of appeals decision
and a favorable result from the Supreme Court’s variable certiorari
process.160
There are more efficacious avenues. Ideally, Congress should
modernize this statute, and in the interim, prosecutors should be directed
to use DPAs or NPAs to more fairly ensure that corporations are
complying with the MBTA and protecting surrounding wildlife, rather
than selectively bringing only certain industry-types to court.
A. Redrafting the MBTA to Either Include an Incidental-Take Exception
or More Expressly Hold Unintentional Corporate Actors Liable
The MBTA is due for an update. Congress should redefine who can
be liable for “taking” or “killing” a migratory bird.161 The MBTA is
156. See infra text accompanying note 163; see also Citizens Interested in Bull Run, Inc. v.
Edrington, 781 F. Supp. 1502, 1510 (D. Or. 1991) (“The fundamental purpose of [the MBTA] is to
protect migratory birds from destruction in an unequal contest between hunter and bird, and to
provide severe penalties for market hunters who receive commercial benefit from the sale of
migratory bird parts.” (internal quotations omitted)); cf. Gaynor et al., supra note 14, at B-10–B-12
(suggesting relation to the rule of lenity).
157. See supra Part III.
158. Robbins, supra note 38, at 598.
159. Id. Robbins notes that only two appellate cases deal with industrial setting creating
indirect harm. Id. (citing FMC Corp. and Apollo Energies). Robbins ignores Newton and Seattle
Audubon. The logging industry seems to fall in line with industrial activity indirectly harming
migratory birds. The appellate consideration of the MBTA’s language in the industrial or
commercial context seems larger than just two cases; though nonetheless, it remains a small pool.
160. See SUP. CT. R. 10. See generally Saul Brenner, Granting Certiorari by the United States
Supreme Court: An Overview of the Social Science Studies, 92 LAW LIB. J. 194 (2000).
161. See McKinsey, supra note 11, at 91. Any legislative change to the MBTA potentially
results in the United States violating its treaty obligations through one of the four bilateral treaties it
incorporates. However, the treaties seem to represent minimum levels of commitment to migratory
bird preservation and are generally directed at what birds should be protected. See Andrus v. Allard,

28

Seattle Journal of Environmental Law

[Vol. 3:1

nearly one century old, yet its broad language implicates modern
technologies, such as wind turbines, that were not even a part of the U.S.
commercial or industrial landscape in 1918.162 When Congress took
action in 1918 to address the United States’ diminishing migratory bird
population, it was largely in response to shrinking game-bird numbers.163
However, since 1918, the MBTA has only been altered to reflect more
bilateral treaties that the United States entered,164 or to update monetary
fine amounts.165 Moreover, with the prevalence of wind farms, Congress
is faced with competing environmental policies.166 On the one hand,
Congress has pushed forth renewable energy policies and incentives167 at
the heart of which wind farms rest. On the other hand, the United States,
ninety-four years ago, entered into and legislatively adopted a treaty
aimed at protecting migratory birds.168 That treaty and its wildlifepreserving focuses are still in place today.169 The result is a quarrel
between competing environmental movements: wildlife preservation
versus renewable energy.
444 U.S. 51, 62 n.18 (1979) (“[I]n as much as the Conventions represent binding international
commitments, they establish minimum protections for wildlife . . . .”); Corcoran & Colbourn, supra
note 24, at 361–69 (suggesting that the treaties set a bare minimum policy agreement, mostly
regarding an economic focus on preservation, and that Congress seems to have flexibility to work
with them). While any legislative change to the MBTA must not violate treaty obligations, more
specific provisions regarding who can violate the act seem unlikely to do that.
162. See, e.g., McKinsey, supra note 11, at 78 (“Because the MBTA’s scope is so expansive,
its authority reaches probably every wind energy project.”); Corcoran & Colbourn, supra note 24, at
370, 385–86. See generally Paul Boudreaux, Think Less Like a Mountain, and More Like a Realist,
in STRATEGIES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL SUCCESS 115, 129 (Michael Allan Wolf ed., 2005) (“Without
clear definitions and without sensible administrative applications, [environmental] terms can be
twisted far from their originally intended meaning. When contortions are made by those hostile to
the laws, it is cause for consternation among environmentalists. But when they are made by those
supportive of the laws, it is ground for fixing the laws whenever the chance arises.”).
163. Finet, supra note 145, at 7–8; Lilley & Firestone, supra note 18, at 1178. Finet suggests
that the legislative history, while unclear, also accounts for Congressional concerns over bird habitat
and preservation of “insectivorious” birds, due to their utility. Finet, supra note 145, at 8.
164. See Lilley & Firestone, supra note 18, at 1179 (explaining that the MBTA had been
amended to recognize other bilateral treaties between the United States and “Mexico in 1936, Japan
in 1972, and the U.S.S.R. in 1976”); see also Corcoran & Colbourn, supra note 24, at 361–67
(describing the treaty conventions that have been incorporated in the MBTA).
165. See Migratory Bird Treaty Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-312, § 103(1), 112 Stat.
2956, 2956 (1998), which amended the misdemeanor fine to become $15,000 per bird death.
166. McKinsey, supra note 11, at 91.
167. See, e.g., Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, 119 Stat. 624; Business Energy
Investment
Tax
Credit,
AGSTAR,
http://www.epa.gov/agstar/tools/funding/incentive/USbusinessenergyinvestmenttaxcredit.html (last
visited Apr. 17, 2012) (explaining the tax-incentive program created in 2009 to encourage
investment in clean energy projects).
168. Migratory Bird Treaty Act, ch. 128, 40 Stat. 755 (1918) (giving effect to Convention
Between the United States and Great Britain for the Protection of Migratory Birds, U.S.–Gr. Brit.,
Aug. 16, 1916, 39 Stat. 1709).
169. 16 U.S.C. §§ 703–712 (2006).

2013]

The Prosecutor’s Vulture

29

Some argue that Congress needs to take a stand on which direction
it now serves to promote.170 There appear two constructive options.
Option one is to create an incidental-take exception. This would relieve
from MBTA liability all wind farms that unintentionally kill migratory
birds, furthering the promotion of clean energy in light of wildlife
destruction. Option two is to reaffirm the MBTA’s force against all
commercial entities that unintentionally kill migratory birds by expressly
writing into the Act that section 707(a) includes entities with no relation
to hunting or gaming. This would reinforce the wildlife preservation
policies at the heart of the MBTA.
The incidental-take exception may be the best approach. Not only
does it capture the balanced approach discussed above (that takes into
account fairness to commercial entities),171 but, in addition, the MBTA’s
legislative history suggests that the root of the MBTA is wildlife
preservation in lieu of hunting practices.172 Commercial entities not
related to hunting or gaming seem unlikely to have been thought of when
the MBTA was created,173 so the instincts of the judges that have read an
exception into the Act may be correct. However, the plain language of
the statute still ropes in all unintentional corporate entities, so legislation
is likely needed to best clear up this confusion. Moreover, judicial
opinions that have read-in an incidental-take exception have been
criticized by other courts, scholars, and interest groups, for reading the
statute too narrowly,174 so legislative change seems necessary to fix any
ambiguities.
John Arnold McKinsey agrees with option one, and has proposed
the following language to alter the MBTA:
170. McKinsey, supra note 11, at 91.
171. See supra notes 144–147 and accompanying text.
172. H.R. REP. NO. 64-968, at 1–4 (1917); H.R. REP. NO. 64-app’x, at 116 (1917) (remarks by
Hon. Dudley Doolittle); see also Newton Cnty. Wildlife Ass’n v. U.S. Forest Serv., 113 F.3d 110,
115 (8th Cir. 1997); Seattle Audubon Soc’y v. U.S. Forest Serv., 952 F.2d 297, 302 (9th Cir. 1991);
Mickell Jimenez, Sierra Club v. Martin: The Eleventh Circuit’s Interpretation of the Migratory Bird
Treaty Act, 18 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 159, 160 (1998). The 1917 congressional debates
surrounding the proposed act show the congressmen at the time expressing, almost exclusively, their
concerns over hunting practices, bird populations reduced by hunting, and birds becoming extinct
due to shooting. H.R. REP. NO. 64-968, at 1–4; 56 CONG. Rec. 7364, 7370. In showing his distaste
for the MBTA, Representative Dudley Doolittle identified that “there were 80,000 wild ducks killed
in a single week” due to a hunting expedition, and that “conservation” to many involved in the
enactment of the MBTA was to “legislate against . . . the hunting season.” H.R. REP. NO. 64-app’x,
at 116.
173. See congressional discussions in H.R. Rep. No. 64-968 and H.R. Rep. No. 64-app’x, at
116, which show that most of the discourse surrounding the U.S. legislative enactment of the treaty
between the United States and Great Britain involved hunting and gaming, not unrelated commercial
enterprise.
174. See supra Part III.
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[I]t shall be unlawful at any time, by any means or in any manner,
excepting therein incidental harm or death to birds occurring from
birds striking structures, including rotating or stationary wind energy turbine blades reasonably designed to minimize such collisions, to pursue, hunt, take, capture, kill . . . any migratory bird
. . . .175

The proposed language only addresses structures. McKinsey’s language
successfully relieves wind-turbine operators (that meet certain design
requirements) from MBTA liability. But McKinsey’s language leaves
open the likeliness that other industry-types incidentally killing
migratory birds, such as the oil companies and pesticides users discussed
in Part III, would remain subject to the MBTA: oil pits and crop fields
could incidentally lead to bird deaths, and these items do not expressly
meet the characterization of a “structure.”
A singled-out exception for buildings and wind turbines is a good
start, to be sure. Wind turbines, for example, are at the heart of this
controversy for their increasing impacts on bird mortality rates and
unforeseen clash with the MBTA’s conservation policies.176 If Congress
is to work an exception into the MTBA, then wind turbines and standing
structures are a good foundation, because what can be more “incidental”
than an instance where a bird collides with an already-there structure?
Moreover, the word striking implies that the bird caused the impact,177
and not the building. McKinsey’s language creates an exception for
commercial entities that are certainly incidental when taking or killing
migratory birds.
However, a singled-out exception for buildings and wind turbines
would do little to relieve the inconsistent MBTA prosecution across
certain industry-types. Indeed, all entities that are not wind farms or that
incidentally kill birds in ways without structures would still be liable
under McKinsey’s proposal.178

175. McKinsey, supra note 11, at 91. Immunity for companies incidentally killing bats has also
been suggested. Laura Householder, Have We All Gone Batty? The Need for a Better Balance
Between the Conservation of Protected Species and the Development of Clean Renewable Energy,
36 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 807, 836–37 (2012) (suggesting that companies
incidentally killing bats in violation of the Endangered Species Act should be immune from the
citizens suit provision of that Act if they take certain actions to mitigate deaths, and that this would
reduce litigation costs and actually help endangered species).
176. See supra notes 8–9, 13 and accompanying text.
177. See MERRIAM–WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1236 (11th ed. 2011), defining
“strike” as “to take a course [or] . . . to aim.”
178. Of course, this depends on how “structure” is defined. However, as shown in Part III, oil
pits and fields of crops have caused bird deaths resulting in MBTA liability. Even a very loose
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If an incidental-take exception is the direction Congress takes, then
Congress should create language that is more inclusive than McKinsey’s
suggestion. Instead of limiting the language to “structures” and spelling
out “wind turbines,” the exception could read as follows:
It shall be unlawful at any time, by any means or in any manner, excepting therein incidental harm or death to birds
(1) occurring from birds striking structures reasonably designed to
minimize such collisions, or
(2) resulting from commercial or industrial operations unrelated to
hunting, gaming, or poaching practices if the commercial or industrial operations are reasonably designed to minimize such harm or
death to birds.

This language would capture, for example, oil pits that are designed in a
way that can reasonably prevent bird deaths. If an exception is created,
then it should be created in a way that does not further inconsistent and
unfair application of the MBTA—a more inclusive exception is more
likely to ensure fairness.
If an exception is not created, then Congress should incorporate
option two. If Congress decides that unintentional corporate actors are
meant to be liable for MBTA violations, then it should clarify what is
meant by “any person, association, partnership, or corporation.”179 Using
option two, a new subsection, section 707(a)(1), could expressly
integrate unintentional corporate actors with the following language:
Section 707(a) applies even if a person, association, partnership, or
corporation is not in the business or practice of hunting, gaming, or
poaching.

This added language would eliminate any judicially carved-out
exceptions for unintentional corporate actors, such as the exception
adopted by the judge in Brigham Oil.180 Those that currently read the
MBTA broadly—such that any actors that kill birds are liable under the
MBTA, irrespective of how the birds died—would certainly favor
proposed section 707(a)(1) over the incidental-take exception.181
To be sure, option one might be the more sensible approach,
because the congressional intent in 1918 seems relatively devoid the

definition of “structure” would not seem to include an oil pit or agricultural field, and thus those
particular entities would still be subject to MBTA liability.
179. See 16 U.S.C. § 707(a) (2006).
180. United States v. Brigham Oil & Gas L.P., 840 F. Supp. 2d 1202 (D.N.D. 2012).
181. See supra Part III.A; Giese, supra note 83, at 1169–74.
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thought of MBTA prosecutions of unintentional corporate actors.182
However, until any congressional action is taken, prosecutors still
maintain unfettered discretion. Moreover, if option two is chosen, then
all that is fixed is the circuit split. With my proposal for option two—
section 707(a)(1)—prosecutors would still have unfettered discretion to
bring charges against selective commercial entities that accidentally kill
birds and to not charge others, such as wind-farm operators.
If there is no congressional action and no legislation crafted to
change the incidental-take exception, then DPAs and NPAs may most
effectively curb the negative impacts that prosecutorial discretion has on
MBTA enforcement. With DPAs and NPAs, reputational harms could be
limited for less severe MBTA violators, while full-blown prosecutions
could still be used for repeat actors and more blameworthy MBTA
violators.
B. Using DPAs and NPAs to Enforce the MBTA
DPAs and NPAs fit nicely with MBTA prosecution of unintentional
corporate actors. Prosecutorial agreements would give corporate actors
who do not mean to violate the MBTA opportunities to take proactive
approaches toward preventing more bird deaths without having to endure
embarrassing and costly prosecution.183 Moreover, prosecutorial
agreements could mellow the detriments caused by inconsistent MBTA
application across industry-types: with DPAs and NPAs, prosecutors still
have wide discretion, but at least those chosen for investigation would
not be subject to burdensome litigation.184 Also, if DPAs or NPAs are
182. Arguably though, the variety of birds added to the protected list since 1918 suggests that
the MBTA’s scope has expanded. Each of the Mexico, Japan, and U.S.S.R. treaties contained
language suggesting that nongame birds were just as important to protect as game birds. See
Corcoran & Colbourn, supra note 24, at 390 n.233. However, the conventions were steeped
primarily in economic factors, and the U.S. legislative history was focused almost exclusively on
hunting. See id. at 362; see supra text accompanying note 163.
183. See Erik Paulsen, Note, Imposing Limits on Prosecutorial Discretion in Corporate
Prosecution Agreements, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1434, 1437–38 (2007) (characterizing prosecutor
agreements as a “middle ground” where charges are either deferred or not brought at all); Eric
Lichtblau, Leniency for Big Corporations in the U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 9, 2008,
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/09/business/worldbusiness/09iht-justice.1.11805997.html?page
wanted=2%3C!-Undefined%20dynamic%20function%20data_sanitationlib::sanitize_string:1%20called--%3E
(noting that some officials believe DPAs allow for more cooperation with defendants and are less
likely to be destructive to business); cf. Householder, supra note 175, at 836 (suggesting that
creating immunities for corporations that unintentionally kill bats could shift companies’ focuses
away from litigation and instead toward mitigation and “actually helping the species”).
184. For example, former Attorney General John Ashcroft has commented that prosecutorial
agreements can “avoid destroying corporations,” and that “a corporate indictment can be a corporate
death sentence.” Lichtblau, supra note 183 (quoting remarks of John Ashcroft at a March 2008
congressional hearing); see also Block & Feinberg, supra note 154, at 5 (noting that DPA and NPA

2013]

The Prosecutor’s Vulture

33

encouraged by the U.S. DOJ, then federal prosecutors might be more
willing to investigate wind-farms, because DPAs and NPAs encourage
proactive, remedial regulation rather than punishment, with, perhaps, less
risk of clashing the competing renewable-energy and wildlifepreservation policies than federal prosecution. Successful MBTA-based
DPA and NPA implementation would, of course, need stringent internal
guidance to prevent further inconsistent MBTA application.185
1. Prosecutorial Agreements and Their Benefits and Drawbacks
Prosecutorial agreements allow prosecutors to impose regulatory
terms upon actors to ensure forward-looking compliance with federal
statutes, without a full-fledged criminal prosecution.186 In the case of a
NPA, “no charging document is filed provided that the company adheres
to the agreement.”187 In the case of a DPA, the prosecutor files charges,
but “agrees to defer prosecution for a given period of time,” and the
charges would be dismissed if the charged entity complies with the terms
of the agreement.188 If prosecutors manage to formulate DPAs or NPAs
with unintentional corporate MBTA violators, society benefits twice: a
DPA or NPA would hold unintentional corporate actors accountable for
MBTA violations while also causing them to remediate their properties
to prevent further harms. The corporations benefit too: “[D]eferred [or
non-] prosecution attempts to avoid harming the employees, investors,
and markets that rely upon corporations to survive criminal liability.”189

usage could reduce the “public embarrassment and reputational damage” that can result from
criminal indictments for corporate environmental harms).
185. See Paulsen, supra note 183, at 1444, 1455–62 (explaining how prosecutors have wide
discretion to select the terms of prosecution agreements and that prosecutors may be prone to
“overreaching”). See generally Peter Spivack & Sujit Raman, Regulating the “New Regulators”:
Current Trends in Deferred Prosecution Agreements, 45 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 159 (2008).
186. Barkow & Barkow, Introduction, supra note 125, at 2–3; see also Paulsen, supra note
183, at 1439–43 (noting that prosecution agreements “feature a variety of terms,” including
“provisions about cooperation, acknowledgement of criminal conduct, business reforms, penalties,
and independent monitors”).
187. Block & Feinberg, supra note 154, at 5; see also Spivack & Raman, supra note 185, at
160.
188. Block & Feinberg, supra note 154, at 5. Spivack and Raman refer to this approach as the
“typical corporate deferral scenario.” Spivack & Raman, supra note 185, at 160–61. The deferral
approach evidences a prosecutorial focus, in the corporate setting, that seeks to reform and ensure
compliance, as opposed to “indict, . . . prosecute, and . . . punish.” Id. at 161.
189. Greenblum, supra note 26, at 1881; see also Jill Fisch, Panel Discussion, Criminalization
of Corporate Law: The Impact on Shareholders and Other Constituents, 2 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 91,
93–94 (2007) (noting that those really harmed when corporations are criminally prosecuted and
sanctioned are the shareholders).
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The use of prosecutor agreements has risen steadily since 2000;190
however, the U.S. DOJ’s environmental crimes section has “long resisted
the use of DPAs and NPAs as a means of resolving potential criminal
charges against corporate defendants.”191 To be fair, prosecutorial
agreements let corporations out of more severe punishments and risk that
corporations will act less cautiously if they know federal prosecution is
paused or dismissed.192 Some argue that NPAs and DPAs are
unsatisfactory responses to criminal activity generally because they let
criminals essentially off the hook.193 And for corporations, DPAs and
NPAs are not even complete stops—indeed, in the context of a DPA,
where charges have already been filed, the agreement only delays
prosecution so long as corporations comply with the regulatory terms.194
In addition, if a company is public, then SEC reporting requirements may
be triggered.195 MBTA-based DPA and NPA enforcement would have to
endure these drawbacks.
The drawbacks can be alleviated, however, by the proactivity DPAs
and NPAs employ and the feasibility of monitoring and remediation
requirements to prevent further bird deaths.196 What prosecutorial
agreement provisions may include is flexible, with such possibilities as
bird death-mitigation reforms, cooperation requirements, public
acknowledgements about criminal wrongs, and even penalties.197 An
190. Cindy R. Alexander & Mark A. Cohen, The Causes of Corporate Crime: An Economic
Perspective, in PROSECUTORS IN THE BOARDROOM, supra note 125, at 11, 12–13 & fig.1.1, tbl.1.1
(noting the rise of DPAs and NPAs from 2000 to 2008, peaking in 2007). The use of DPAs in place
of white collar crime prosecutions was infrequent until the late 1990s; Greenblum, supra note 26, at
1871–72.
191. Mark D. Hopson et al., supra note 19, at V-6. David Uhlmann, once head of the U.S.
DOJ’s Environmental Crimes Section, has taken the view that it is “wrong to use deferred
prosecution agreements to settle corporate crime cases”:
My view is that, if a corporation commits a crime, as when an individual commits a
crime, it should be held criminally responsible. It should not be the case that a corporation can pony up large sums of money, agree to cooperate with an investigation,
and thereby avoid criminal prosecution.
Russell Mokhiber, Uhlmann Says It Is Wrong to Defer Prosecution of Corporate Crime,
GREENCHANGE (June 6, 2008), http://www.greenchange.org/article.php?id=2745 (quoting an
interview of David Uhlmann with the Corporate Crime Reporter in June 2008).
192. See Lichtblau, supra note 183.
193. Id.
194. Richard A. Epstein, Deferred Prosecution Agreements on Trial: Lessons from the Law of
Unconstitutional Conditions, in PROSECUTORS IN THE BOARDROOM, supra note 125, at 38, 39;
Paulsen, supra note 183, at 1437–38.
195. Block & Feinberg, supra note 154, at 7.
196. See infra Part V.B.3.
197. See generally Paulsen, supra note 183, at 1429–43 (noting the variety of potential
DPA/NPA features). Federal prosecutors have no requirement to publish or release to the public the
terms of corporate prosecutorial agreements; Spivack & Raman, supra note 185, at 180–81.
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agreement could even require that a MBTA violator announce its MBTA
violations publically, holding that company publically accountable but
without the potentially more harmful and costly litigation.198 Ultimately,
the NPA/DPA approach ensures flexible fairness. And this approach
seems more fitting than either not prosecuting violating wind farms at all
or completely prosecuting clean-energy wind farms for environmental
violations that possibly do not outweigh the environmental benefits they
produce.199
2. The Need for DPA/NPA Guidance
To achieve flexible fairness through prosecutorial agreements,
specific, uniform guidance would be necessary as a means for ensuring
that MBTA-based DPAs or NPAs effectively relieve the inconsistent
corporate MBTA prosecution that currently exists.200 The “risk of
inconsistent policymaking” by prosecutors selectively entering into
DPAs or NPAs is high; there are nearly 100 U.S. attorneys, each with
relatively unfettered prosecutorial discretion,201 and surely different
viewpoints. Indeed, without DOJ guidance specific to environmental
criminal cases, uncertainty over how and when DPAs or NPAs might be
used in an MBTA context will continue.202
As a general matter, guidance over how and when prosecutors
decide to enter into DPAs or NPAs with companies is limited.203
Guidance currently comes from the DOJ’s Principles of Federal
Interestingly, arguments have been made that the lack of publication and filing requirements—
although the DOJ often issues press releases—causes concern for interested parties and the public,
because the terms are nearly impossible to locate. See id. However, any public announcement or
publication requirement could be written into an MBTA-based DPA or NPA, further highlighting the
flexible balance of punishment and reform that these agreements potentially offer.
198. This could even work as a way of “shaming” the company into future compliance. See
generally David A. Skeel, Jr., Shaming in Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1811 (2001). And
although public shaming would still trigger reputational harm, it would at least not be in combination
with lengthy and costly litigation known to impact stock prices and have detrimental effects on
shareholders. See Fisch, supra note 189, at 94.
199. The balance between the environmental pluses and minuses of wind energy turn on clean
energy, economic considerations, and potential threats to wildlife; this may be an impossible balance
to tip though. See generally Reed Elizabeth Loder, Breath of Life: Ethical Wind Power and Wildlife,
10 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 507, 517, 526–29 (2008–2009) (suggesting that wind-energy introduces a cost–
benefit analysis in the context of wildlife).
200. See, e.g., Anthony S. Barkow & Rachel E. Barkow, Conclusion to PROSECUTORS IN THE
BOARDROOM, supra note 125, at 249, 250 (“As an initial matter, prosecutors should establish
internal guidance describing what steps prosecutors should take before imposing regulations on
companies.”).
201. See id. at 251; Block & Feinberg, supra note 154, at 8–9 (“Prosecutors have few, if any,
rules to guide their discretion” over how DPAs and NPAs will be used and structured).
202. See Block & Feinberg, supra note 154, at 8.
203. Barkow & Barkow, Conclusion, supra note 200, at 252, 257 n.2.
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Prosecution of Business Organizations,204 but these guidelines offer little
in the way of uniform instruction over what steps prosecutors should take
or what considerations they should make before entering agreements in
lieu of prosecuting. In order for prosecutorial agreements to
meaningfully replace the current mess of MBTA enforcement against
unintentional corporate actors, better guidance would be needed.
To start, DOJ guidance should direct prosecutors to go the route of
DPAs or NPAs unless the MBTA violator being investigated is highly
blameworthy. Highly blameworthy unintentional corporate actors would
include repeat offenders (those who have been contacted multiple times
about bird deaths205), commercial entities causing a high incidence of
bird deaths at a particular location,206 or those that refuse to implement
safe equipment.207 Such guidance would not prevent prosecutors from
investigating only certain industry-types, but it would prevent all
industry-types subject to the MBTA from enduring embarrassing
prosecution except in cases of particularly bad actors.208 Using DPAs or
NPAs for less blameworthy unintentional corporate actors ties back to
the policy behind the incidental-take exception proposed above—that the
MBTA is not meant to make white collar criminals out of those who
accidentally kill birds and that have no relation to hunting or gaming.
With proper guidance, DPAs and NPAs become worthwhile, flexible,
and fair tools to ensure corporate actors are complying with MBTA
provisions and proactively mitigating the harm they cause to migratory
birds.
3. Potential MBTA-Based DPA/NPA Measures
MBTA-based DPAs and NPAs would be able to set terms for
monitoring and remedial techniques.209 Proposed technical terms of any
204. 9 USAM § 28.000.
205. See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
206. See, e.g., United States v. Corbin Farm Serv., 444 F. Supp. 510, 531 (E.D. Cal. 1978)
(noting that 1,000 bird deaths were caused by the defendant); see supra note 11 and accompanying
text (discussing 5,000(+) annual deaths at Altamont Pass).
207. E.g., Ruffin Prevost, Utility to Pay for Bird Deaths, BILLINGS GAZETTE (July 11, 2009),
http://billingsgazette.com/news/state-and-regional/wyoming/article_d9fc9894-6e94-11de-8937001cc4c03286.html (noting PacifiCorp’s failure to update power equipment as a factor in why it was
prosecuted for killing more than 200 protected eagles).
208. Guidance of this sort would have prevented the seven companies in Brigham Oil from
being fully prosecuted, because those companies combined for a total of only twenty-seven dead
birds. See supra note 8 and accompanying text. Restricting prosecution to only highly blameworthy
actors is consistent with calls for more commonsense in MBTA enforcement. See Hurley, supra note
14 (quoting oil and gas law expert Kevin Gaynor, “Questions have to be asked: What we are doing
as a society is chasing 27 migratory birds?”).
209. See Paulsen, supra note 183, at 1444–45 (explaining the discretion prosecutors have in
setting DPA or NPA terms).
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MBTA-based prosecutor agreement are beyond the scope of this
paper.210 However, studies demonstrate that technology to lessen avian
mortality exists in a number of forms. For example, marking or placing
alerting devices on power-line wires has been found to reduce the
number of bird fatalities at power-line sites.211 Oil pit operators have
remedial tactics available as well, such as using nets, closed tanks as
replacements to pits, or deterrent methods such as reflectors or flashing
lights to attempt to deter birds.212 Finally, wind turbines can be made less
fatal to birds by slowing or altering blade-rotation speed, painting blades,
using flashing lights or diverters, or just reducing tower height.213

210. This Article is not meant to craft the best technical NPA or DPA terms or to suggest the
best ways available to correct industry infrastructure and operations to comport with surrounding
wildlife. Rather, the point is to introduce that remedial options exist.
211. See, e.g., ROBERT K. MURPHY ET AL., UNIV. NEB.–KEARNEY, EFFECTIVENESS OF AVIAN
COLLISION AVERTERS IN PREVENTING MIGRATORY BIRD MORTALITY FROM POWERLINE STRIKES IN
THE CENTRAL PLATTE RIVER, NEBRASKA 1 (2008–2009); MARCUS L. YEE, CAL. ENERGY COMM’N,
TESTING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF AN AVIAN FLIGHT DIVERTER FOR REDUCING AVIAN COLLISIONS
WITH DISTRIBUTION POWER LINES IN THE SACRAMENTO VALLEY, CALIFORNIA 2, 22 (2008); Rafael
Barrientos et al., Meta-Analysis of the Effectiveness of Marked Wire in Reducing Avian Collisions
with Power Lines, 25 CONSERV. BIOLOGY 893, 897 (2011).
212. PEDRO RAMIREZ, JR., U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., RESERVE PIT MANAGEMENT: RISKS
TO MIGRATORY BIRDS (2009), available at http://tutelasalute.info/pdf/adjacent/3.pdf (noting that
netting or immediate removal of drilling can lead to reduced avian mortality); Pepper W. Trail,
Avian Mortality at Oil Pits in the United States: A Review of the Problem and Efforts for Its
Solution, 38 ENVTL. MGMT. 532, 543 (2006) (noting that well-installed netting, with steel frames, or
closed tanks instead of pits, reduce avian mortality); Chuck Haga, Oilfield Operators Urged to
Protect
Birds,
Other
Wildlife,
GRAND
FORKS
HERALD
(Aug.
19,
2011),
http://www.grandforksherald.com/event/article/id/213274/ (identifying these options, but noting that
not all are equally successful).
213. RIGHTER, supra note 12, at 107 (mentioning lowering of rotation speed); ANDREA
KINGSLEY & BECKY WHITTAM, POTENTIAL IMPACTS OF WIND TURBINES ON BIRDS AT NORTH
CAPE, PRINCE EDWARD ISLAND 18 (2001) (identifying studies finding success with lowering height,
adding lights or diverters, and painting blades), available at http://www.bsceoc.org/download/PEIwind.pdf; see also CRITERION POWER PARTNERS, LLC, CRITERION WIND
PROJECT, GARRETT COUNTY, MARYLAND BAT HABITAT CONSERVATION PLAN 37–45 (2011),
available at
http://www.fws.gov/chesapeakebay/EndSppWeb/Criterion%20docs/Draft%20Criterion%20HCP.pdf
(proposing mitigation and monitor program, including design to limit “blade pitch,” to reduce bat
fatalities). However, slowing rotation speed or stopping turbines can result in revenue losses for
operators. See Scientists Find Successful Way to Reduce Bat Deaths at Wind Turbines,
SCIENCEDAILY (Sept. 28, 2009), http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2009/09/090928095347.htm.
The Department of the Interior announced new voluntary measures for wind-energy development in
March 2012, focused on minimizing harms to wildlife. U.S. FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE, LANDBASED
WIND
ENERGY
GUIDELINES,
IV
(2012),
available
at
http://www.fws.gov/windenergy/docs/WEG_final.pdf; U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, Interior Announces
Onshore
Wind
Energy
Guidelines
(Mar. 23, 2012),
http://www.fws.gov/cno/press/release.cfm?rid=373. These new guidelines could prove helpful for
setting the most appropriate DPA or NPA regulations.
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All monitoring could be done by routine ground inspections or by
real-time radar.214 Prosecutors (or the USFWS) could monitor to ensure
compliance by enforcing an allotted amount of annual bird deaths,
similar to a permit.215 And, in addition to mitigation strategies and
monitoring approaches, prosecutorial agreements could invoke creative
punishment tactics in lieu of traditional prosecution. Such tactics seem
endless, and could involve less costly (but still effective) methods such
as the public announcements or cooperation requirements mentioned
above.216
In the context of the MBTA, the prosecution agreement benefits
arguably offset the negatives (especially considering the number of
remedial techniques that agreements could require companies to
employ). Corporations unintentionally violating the MBTA may not even
know they violated the Act.217 Plus, with the MBTA’s current language,
even one dead bird renders actors liable, depending on the U.S.
jurisdiction.218 Minimal damage potentially subjects companies to severe
punishment—financially and through reputational harm—but DPAs and
NPAs can help ensure fairer application of the MBTA across
jurisdictions and among different industry-types while also staying true
to the MBTA’s preservation focus.
VI. CONCLUSION
The MBTA is in dire need of uniformity in how it positions
unintentional corporate actors as white collar criminals. When a bird
lands in an oil pit, feeds on pesticide-riddled crops, or hits a wind
turbine, criminal prosecution may not be the best response. The plain
language of the MBTA provides, however, that everyday commercial
214. Lilley & Firestone, supra note 18, at 1211.
215. Cf. McKinsey, supra note 11, at 91–92 (suggesting that an alternative solution to the
incidental-take provision would be a statutorily created “permit”); Lilley & Firestone, supra note 18,
at 1210. The USFWS has published MBTA permit rules in the Code of Federal Regulations, but the
permits generally relate to specific business enterprise directly related to migratory birds and
protection of migratory birds, and do not include a permit-allotment for incidental takings or killings
of migratory birds. See Migratory Bird Permits, 50 C.F.R. § 21 (2011). It seems that the MBTA
would allow the USFWS to develop a general incidental-take permit so long as the permit is
compatible with the terms of treaties connected to the Act. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 704, 712 (2006); see
also HOLLAND & HART LLC, INGAA FOUND., INC., DEVELOPMENT OF A PERMIT PROGRAM FOR
INCIDENTAL TAKE OF MIGRATORY BIRDS 5–8, 46–47 (2010), available at
http://www.ingaa.org/File.aspx?id=11062 (assessing the feasibility of a USFWS-based incidentaltake permit program).
216. See supra notes 190–191 and accompanying text.
217. See United States v. Rollins, 706 F. Supp. 742, 744–45 (D. Idaho 1989), where the court
suggested that there was no way for the defendant farmer to have known his pesticide application
could lead to MBTA liability.
218. See supra Part III.
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and industrial operators subject themselves to prosecution. If even one
bird is killed by a commercial entity’s operations, then fines,
imprisonment, and reputational damage could soon follow.
The MBTA is ancient—at least in terms of environmental
statutes219—so a legislative or prosecutorial reform seems appropriate. A
plain reading of the MBTA’s broad language ropes in any “association,
partnership, or corporation,”220 but that does not mean that the statute
was intended to make white collar criminals out of all unintentional
corporate actors that incidentally take or kill a migratory bird. In effect,
the legislative history suggests that the MBTA was designed to preserve
migratory bird populations in lieu of hunting practices,221 not everything
under the sun. Judges are reading the MBTA in countless directions and
prosecutors are charging certain industry-types with MBTA violations
and not others, such as wind farms. Congress might decide an incidentaltake exception is most warranted, or alternatively, it could find that the
MBTA is best suited to cover all entities that take or kill migratory birds.
Either way, legislative action seems necessary to remedy the inconsistent
application and use of the MBTA’s criminal provisions.
Unless and until legislative action is taken, prosecutors still have
unfettered discretion over whether to charge entities with MBTA
violations. Prosecutors have been criticized for not charging the wind
industry for the 400,000-plus avian mortalities it causes each year.222
Most recently, the criticisms are in response to the Brigham Oil
prosecution.223 Because prosecutors have so much discretion over who to
sue, internal guidance pushing DPA and NPA usage could relieve the
inconsistent and arguably unfair enforcement of the MBTA. DPA and
NPA agreements can lessen the reputational blow that subjects of MBTA
prosecutions could incur. Prosecutorial agreements are also proactive—
for example, such agreements could push violators to develop birdfriendly infrastructure so that potential fines and indictments may be
avoided. In fact, DPAs and NPAs directed at wind-farm operators could
bridge the competing renewable-energy and wildlife-preservation
policies by forcing the wind-farm operator to meet certain conditions

219. See Brickey, supra note 20, at 488.
220. 16 U.S.C. § 707(a) (2006).
221. See supra text accompanying notes 165, 172.
222. See sources cited supra notes 8–10, 14.
223. See, e.g., Letter from Newt Gingrich, supra note 8; American Bird Conservancy Response
to Speaker Gingrich, supra note 10. As mentioned previously, the most recent related MBTA
decision is United States v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., No. C-06-563, 2012 WL 3866857 (S.D. Tex.
Sept. 5, 2012). Further research should assess how the Citgo Petroleum case fits among the cases
analyzed throughout this Article.
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directed at lowering bird fatalities, without causing the reputational harm
often resulting from an indictment.
Brigham Oil brought to light the small problem: that the MBTA is
being selectively used against certain industry-types and not the just-asculpable wind farms. However, the larger concern is that the MBTA
might have gotten away from its original focus on conservation in lieu of
hunting. Congress should flesh out that original purpose, or at least
update the Act. An act that is designed around hunting should not make
unintentional corporate actors white collar criminals; but if an act is
meant to safeguard birds (and make violators criminals) at all costs, then
it is only fair to hold all violators accountable and to make sure that they
know of that possibility. Prosecutorial agreements would be good
supplemental solutions, but legislative reform is required to cure the
overall problem of MBTA enforcement against unintentional corporate
actors.

